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Kappelman, Erik, Master of Arts, Spring 2010 Economics
Abstract
Chair Person: Amanda Dawsey
Gender inequality remains one of the greatest threats to the health and happiness of
women around the world. This thesis investigates how gender inequality affects
women’s levels of happiness. Using household survey data from South Africa and
factor analysis, I estimate the effects different levels of empowerment have on women’s
subjective and emotional well-being. Specifically, I am interested in measuring a pure
empowerment effect, or the effect of empowerment on well-being while holding
consumption constant. I find that the pure effect of higher levels of empowerment
appears to decrease a women’s level of well-being. Although some of the models do
seem to suffer from specification issues, there is evidence that there is a legitimate
negative relationship between a pure empowerment effect and well-being.
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2
1 Introduction
This research explores the relationships between gender empowerment and subjective
well-being (SWB) and emotional well-being (EWB). SWB is generally defined as an
individuals stated level of satisfaction or happiness. Measures of EWB attempt to show
the quality of a person’s emotions, e.g., how many days a week a person feels depressed.
When viewing households through the lens of intrahousehold bargaining models,
women with greater levels of empowerment will also exhibit higher levels of both SWB
and EWB. This increase in EWB and SWB may be wholly a result of greater access to
household resources due to higher levels of empowerment, or gender empowerment may
have an effect on SWB and EWB independent of household consumption. The goal of
this research is to explore the existence and measure the magnitude of any pure effect
increased levels of gender empowerment have on SWB and EWB. I define a pure
empowerment effect as the changes occurring in EWB and SWB as empowerment
changes, while consumption levels are held constant. This is an important distinction,
because much of the existing economic literature studying empowerment actually
attempts to isolate empowerment’s affect on EWB or SWB through consumption.
Amaytra Sen’s 1990 article in The New York Review of Books titled “More than 100
Million Women Are Missing” describes the results of gender bias seen throughout the
world. Sen details the many reasons women around the world end up dying at higher
rates relative to men. These reasons range from poorer treatment within a household,
such as spending less money on female healthcare, to female infanticide. The wide
range of causes of increased relative female mortality is indicative of the scope of the
issue of gender inequality. The United Nations’ measure of gender equality, the Gender
Equality Index, varies from 2.1 percent to 73.3 percent with 100 percent representing a
country without gender inequality.1 So it is clear, that issues related to gender
inequality and empowerment can be vastly different from country to country.
Kabeer (2005) defines empowerment as the ability to make choices, and a lack of
empowerment as being denied the ability to make choices. There has been thorough
research into the relationship between gender empowerment and access to household
consumption and production goods (Udry, 1996; Goldstein and Udry, 2008). It is not
surprising more empowered women tend to have more access to household income. If
SWB and EWB are related to individual utility, then more access to household income
ought to increase SWB and EWB for women. When viewed this way, gender
1United Nations Development Program, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii
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empowerment is just a tool and not an ends in and of itself. Of course, this view point
is over-simplistic. Gender empowerment is more than a tool for access to goods, and
utility theory is only a model, not reality. Measuring a pure empowerment effect would
quantify the value of empowerment independent of consumption gains associated with
increased empowerment.
As previously stated, the goal of this research is to quantify the pure effect a women’s
level of empowerment has on her level of SWB and EWB. To my knowledge there is no
existing economic literature measuring a pure effect of empowerment on SWB or
EWB. Finding a pure effect would add to the existing evidence of the inherent
importance of policies aimed at increasing empowerment for women around the world.
The first step in this process is to explore the theoretical basis for many measures of
gender empowerment within a household by examining intrahousehold bargaining
theory. Once the theoretical methods for measuring empowerment have been
established, it is necessary to explore the theoretical basis for measures of SWB and
EWB, and empirical studies of SWB and EWB. A review of theoretical and empirical
economic literature directly related to gender empowerment is also necessary.
The remainder of this document is broken into five sections. In Section 2 I review the
relevant literature studying gender empowerment, intrahousehold bargaining and EWB
and SWB. Section 3 provides institutional background on South Africa. Section 4
describes the data I use to empirically address my research questions. Section 5
describes the methods I use to analyze the data. Section 6 presents results of my
empirical analysis. Section 7 considers sensitivity testing and Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Intrahousehold Bargaining Literature
2.1.1 The Altruism Model
Samuelson (1956) motivates the need to use intrahousehold bargaining to model
consumer choice as opposed to treating households as if they are individual economic
actors. When grouped together in households, towns, counties or countries a group’s
preferences cannot necessarily be modeled as if they are one autonomous unit.
Samuelson proves that using, so called, ‘community indifference curves’ to represent
the preferences of large groups of people cannot be supported by traditional
microeconomic theory without very restrictive assumptions. Samuelson uses the
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example of international trade. He suggests it is unlikely the choice of one country to
trade with another country is the result of a combined preference schedule of all the
individual preferences of its citizens. Although Samuelson’s international trade
example is correct, a household is much smaller than a country, and households do
sometimes appear to act as a single unit.
Samuelson (1956) uses altruism to explain why households make decisions together.
Specifically, in a two-person household the consumption of person 1 enters into the
utility function of person 2, and visa versa. But altruism alone does not force
household preferences to conform to the usual restrictions of consumer demand.
Samuelson goes on to state that if individual household members have conventional
preferences, if the social welfare function is also conventional and if optimal lump-sum
transfers are always made, then a household’s demand can be observed as a function of
market prices and total income. This function will have properties associated with
regular consumer preferences. Under these restrictive assumptions, Samuelson claims
the theories used to describe a single consumer can be used when describing the family.
These assumptions are too restrictive to assume they apply to all (or any) households.
Samuelson’s work shows that in order to gain true understanding of individual
economic decisions and outcomes within a household, like a relationship between
gender empowerment and SWB and EWB, a more sophisticated model of consumer
choice in the context of the household is needed.
Becker (1974) offers an intermediary model of household bargaining. This model forms
the basis for the more pragmatic bargaining models outlined by Manser and Brown
(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). Becker’s explanation for intrahousehold
interactions is based on the notion of social income and altruism. Social income is the
sum of a persons’ monetary earnings and their self-perceived social status, multiplied
by a shadow price. Becker’s model allows an individual to affect the view of themselves
held by those around them. This implies a person incorporates actions related to
preserving or changing their social standing into their utility maximization problem.
This theory is applied to household allocation of goods.
Becker (1974) defines the head of a household as a person who cares enough about the
other members of the household to share their resources with them. The model
assumes this head of household acts out of altruism and transfers some of their
resources to other members of the household. The model links the head of household’s
income to each individual’s utility through these transfers. Other household members
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then aim to please the head of household either altruistically or selfishly in order to
maintain their transfers.
The primary issue with using this model to describe households in general is that
altruism is far too specific. Although altruism is certainly at work in many households
around the world, it is not likely that people’s altruistic tendencies provide the most
complete explanation of how households are organized.
2.1.2 Cooperative Nash Models
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) move towards a more
complete explanation of household bargaining. They use two-person cooperative games
to describe intrahousehold bargaining. Manser and Brown point out that Becker’s
(1974) altruism explanation of the household ignores the necessary question of
bargaining. Manser and Brown’s models examine the marriage decision in a world of
two people. These two people each have regularly defined and well-behaved utility
functions, and choose to marry because they both gain from the pooling of resources as
well as the love and companionship of marriage. Additionally, their preferences remain
constant as they enter their marriage. Under these conditions, Manser and Brown give
each individual in the marriage a threat point. Their threat point is the level of utility
they could achieve at the current prices and wages if they were unmarried. If the
distribution of goods within a household reaches a point where one person’s utility is
lower than their potential utility as a single person, they are no longer gaining from
the marriage and they divorce and leave the household.
The Nash two-person cooperative bargaining model is detailed in his 1953
Econometrica paper, and is certainly worth discussing here, because it is the
theoretical underpinning of the Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney
(1981) models. Nash introduces the term cooperative in the model not as a statement
of shared interests or goals of the two-players, but rather a confirmation that the
two-players can and will negotiate. Defining cooperative in this manner fits within a
marriage where individuals may have opposing views or preferences, but maintain the
ability to communicate. In Nash’s game, each player begins with the space, Si, of
mixed strategies, si. These strategies are the options each player has independent of
the other. These decisions could be deliberate or random. The inclusion of
randomization reduces the number of strategies each player begins with, which
simplifies the problem (Nash, 1953). Players could combine their spaces, si, and act
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together, if they so chose. If they do not choose to act with the same set of strategies,
Nash outlines a negotiation model to explain how the game could proceed. In order to
form the negotiation model, Nash adds some assumptions to the game setup. Each
player fully understands the rules and operations of the game. Additionally, each
player is fully informed of their own utility function and the other player’s utility
function. Both players are rational. The solution to the game relies on each player’s
known course of action if negotiations fail, the threat (the basis for Manser and
Brown’s threat point). In order for this model to work, the threat of each player must
always be carried out if negotiations fail. The game proceeds as follows, each player i
picks their strategy, si, their threat, which they will enact if their demands are
incompatible with the other player’s. The players then inform each other of their
threats, ti. Each player then independently determines their demand, di. Each player
will only cooperate if cooperation ensures at least a di utility level. The payoffs, ui, are
then determined. If u1  d1|d2 ∧ u2  d2|di, then each players accepts the others
demand and the game is over, no threats are enacted. In any other case, the threats
must be executed. In this case, each player’s payoff is pi(t1, t2). The choice of threats
in the game determines the payoff structure of the game if the players do not
cooperate (Nash, 1953). This incentives players to restrict their demands in order to
achieve cooperation. Nash shows that under these conditions there is a stable
equilibrium in which players use pure, non-random, strategies. Players find a way to
cooperate by adjusting their threats and demands. These conditions would seem to
mimic the conditions of many marriages, depending on social structure and attitudes
of the society in which a marriage exists.
Manser and Brown (1980) present the Nash cooperative model and an asymmetric
dictatorial model. The dictatorial model assumes that one person, the dictator,
autocratically maximizes their utility function, such that, the utility of the other
household member is never below their threat point. Manser and Brown find that a
dictatorial model can be Pareto efficient and conform to the usual constraints of
neoclassical demand.
Manser and Brown (1980) apply the Nash model as a maximization of the product of
the difference between each person’s current utility and threat point. Manser and
Brown also consider a many-person marriage market. They argue that although a more
complex set of assumptions would have to be used, their models and predictions would
continue to function. In addition to possible changes stemming from the inclusion of
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other people in the marriage market, Manser and Brown point out that exogenous
changes to the inputs of each individual’s utility function would need to be taken into
account in an application of this theory. Changes in wages or prices could certainly
effect individual’s threat points and, in turn, their marriage bargaining decisions.
McElroy and Horney (1981) also discuss the Nash-Bargaining approach to household
demand. Their focus is specific to examining empirical methods for testing their
hypothesis that the Nash demand model collapses to the neoclassical model of
demand. There are a few theories put forth by McElroy and Horney that could be
used in testing a household’s bargaining structure, or the power differential between
individuals in a household. One example is testing the non-wage income elasticity of
goods that are privately consumed by a specific household member. If the non-wage
income elasticity of a male-specific good is found to be magnifying the importance of
that good relative to other goods, then McElroy and Horney would describe that male
as selfish. This method also allows one to work backwards towards modeling the
bargaining structure of a household.
Browning and Chirappori (1998) empirically test the theory put forth by McElroy and
Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980). Using household survey data from
Canada, Browning and Chirappori look for evidence of the unitary and collective
household structures using three strata of data. Their strata are couples, single females
and single males. In order to infer whether or not a household exhibits a unitary
structure, Browning and Chirappori estimate each household’s Slutsky matrix. If the
Slutsky matrix is symmetric enough, then the household is considered to be operating
under a unitary structure. In order to estimate elasticities for estimations of the
Slutsky matrices, Browning and Chirappori use data with seven panels collected
between 1974 and 1992. Econometric estimation of a household’s demands is done
using the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System. Browning and Chirappori included
parameters such as car ownership, province of residence and education levels to
estimate preferences. Their tests of the unitary model find that the unitary model is
not rejected for the single male and single female strata, but is rejected for the couples
stratum. These results empirically support the use of a more sophisticated model when
analyzing multiperson household consumption. Browning and Chirappori go on to test
for the presence of a collective household bargaining structure among the couples
stratum. By adding two variables to the right hand side of their estimates, the log of
the wife’s income minus the log of the husband’s income and the wife’s gross income,
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Browning and Chirappori test for symmetry of the Slutsky matrix resulting from the
collective demand specification. They find that they cannot reject the symmetry of
Slutsky matrix after including the collective parameters. Browning and Chirappori
provide hard evidence that a collective bargaining model is at work in multiperson
households. These results are consistent with the earlier results of Browning et al.
(1993) who used a structural approach, also with data from Canada. They also find
that households do not make consumption decisions as an autonomous unit.
Individuals in households make individual decisions within a collective context.
2.1.3 The Separate Spheres Model
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Lundberg and Pollak (1994) outline a intrahousehold
bargaining model that is something of an extension of the the cooperative Nash model.
This model’s construction is predicated on the Nash and altruistic models’ seeming
inability to explain the common held belief that increased income in a household has
differential effects depending upon the household member the income is given too.
Lundberg and Pollak use the example of a 1970’s change in the British system of
allocation of childcare funds too households. The allocation was changed to a cash
transfer directly to the mother. According to Lundberg and Pollak, some British men
felt this change would negatively impact them. These men’s feelings are incorrect
under the Nash cooperative or altruistic intrahousehold allocation models. In both of
these models, once the allocation scheme of a household has been constructed, who
initially receives the household’s income is irrelevant. Lundberg and Pollak describe a
model that accounts for the belief that who receives a cash transfer affects the
distribution of utility in a household.
The primary difference between the Nash cooperative model and the separate spheres
bargaining model has to do with the threat point. Lundberg and Pollak still use a
threat point based bargaining structure, but propose a threat point of non-cooperative
Cournot-Nash equilibrium instead of divorce. The game does not end when the threat
point is reached in the separate spheres model. Instead, a new non-cooperative game
begins. Lundberg and Pollak describe a situation in which there is a public good each
spouse in a two person household can make voluntary contributions too. Within this
situation, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium can be determined. In a one-shot version of the
game a transfer of something like a child care credit has a null effect. The husband’s
contribution to the public good decreases and the wife’s contribution increases by the
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same amount. Lundberg and Pollak expand the game into an infinitely repeated game.
In this game, players can punish one another for deviation from any agreements that
may form. In an infinitely repeated context, a Cournot-Nash system would give the
wife of a household more power as the child care credit is transferred to her from her
husband (Lundberg and Pollak, 1994). This outcome fits with how many people who
are not student’s of economics view households (Lundberg and Pollak, 1994).
Lundberg and Pollak point out many of the benefits to using non-cooperative models,
such as their separate spheres model, to study the household. For one thing, using a
threat point of a less desirable bargaining structure keeps the enforcement for
agreements internal instead of external (Lundberg and Pollak, 1994). This would seem
to produce a more robust model that could be applied to different types of cultures
independent of divorce laws. Also, non-cooperative bargaining models rely on
self-enforcing agreements. Self-enforcing agreements are often times more believable
explanations of human behavior. Lundberg and Pollak display that the field of
intrahousehold bargaining is not only vast, but also far from reaching a consensus on
how the household is best described.
When measuring relationships between gender empowerment and SWB and EWB I
use the Manser and Brown and McElroy and Horney threat points model for
intrahousehold bargaining. Although the separate spheres model does seem more
intuitive, empirical evidence such as Browning and Chirappori (1998) and Browning et
al. (1993) supports the cooperative Nash model.
Measuring gender empowerment is essentially placing the household in which a women
resides on a spectrum between the asymmetric dictatorial model and the symmetric
Nash bargaining model. My empirical analysis assigns each women a level of
empowerment under the assumption there is a bargaining process at work in their
household. I then analyze the relationships between this level of empowerment and
EWB and SWB. Before detailing the existing empirical research measuring levels of
gender empowerment, I discuss the theoretical foundations for economic investigations
of SWB and EWB.
2.2 SWB and EWB
2.2.1 SWB and EWB: Welfare Proxies?
There are essentially two ways to estimate a person’s utility level. The first method
consists of observing a person’s actions or asking questions that might reveal a
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person’s preferences. One example would be measuring the average willingness-to-pay
for newly paved streets in a neighborhood. The average willingness-to-pay could be
used as a crude estimate of the group utility increase from paving the roads. This
stated willingness-to-pay could even be compared with the willingness-to-pay for a new
swing set at the local school, or some other improvement to the neighborhood.
Comparing stated or revealed willingness-to-pay for various goods or improvements is
one way to build preference schedules for individuals. Another method would be to ask
people very direct questions about their preferences such as, do you prefer coffee to
tea? or are happy or not? Measures of SWB are the result of this method of direct
questioning. In the case of SWB, the questions are often times as a simple as, on a
scale of 1 to 10 how happy are you?
Easterlin (1974) is considered to be the first prominent use of happiness data in
economics (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006). Easterlin discusses the use of two types of
reported happiness measures. The first type are responses to questions that ask an
individual to rate their level of happiness on a scale given by a survey. The other type
of responses come from Cantril’s Self-Anchoring Scale. Under this scale an individual
is asked to rate their happiness on a scale on which they have set their real world
reference points for a happiness score of 10 and a happiness score of 1. Easterlin makes
clear there is a difference between economic and social welfare, however, Easterlin also
points out that, within economic research, the two are usually conflated. This suggests
SWB or EWB might be a reasonable proxy for economic welfare.
The results of Easterlin (1974, 1995) are referred to as the Easterlin Paradox. The
paradox is, Easterlin shows evidence that the average SWB in a country seems to
remain constant as mean income in that country rises. This seems to contradict the
use of SWB as a reflection of utility, however, the answer might have to do with
differences between relative and actual income (Easterlin, 1974, 1995; Luttmer, 2005;
Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006). Studying determinants of SWB within groups of
people at any given time is considered to yield usable estimations of various inputs to
an individual’s welfare. Clark et al. (2008) review happiness research in order to better
understand, among other things, the Easterlin Paradox. Clark et al. reviews the
Easterlin Paradox itself and points out that there are some exceptions. One example
includes East Germany following the reunification of Germany. In this case, the
measures of happiness for the East German people and their incomes rose together.
Clark et al. discuss relative income as a potential explanation for the Easterlin
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Paradox in great detail. They create utility functions that correctly reflect utility when
of relative income inputs are included. There are other explanations for the Easterlin
Paradox other than relative income. Clark et al. review literature related to
adaptation as a possible explanation for the Easterlin Paradox. Adaptation refers to
an individual becoming accustomed to their new lifestyle as their income increases.
This would nullify the effect of increases in income, especially at the aggregate level.
Not only will individuals also get used to the new comforts their new found wealth has
given them, they also must adjust to the new discomforts their wealth has brought
them. Clark et al. also bring up important empirical challenges that come along with
studying happiness that are quite relevant to this research. One issue is the noisey
nature of income’s relationship with consumption. As is pointed out be Clark et al.,
utility theory actually uses consumption, not income, as it’s main input. Economists
have long used income as a proxy for consumption. Especially today, in a financially
driven marketplace, income does not necessarily reflect an individual’s level of
consumption. Luckily, household survey data tends to include ample information
directly related to consumption and expenditure. So, studies of SWB can more easily
take income and consumption into account. There is also the issue of missing variables
and endogeneity. Clark et al. review issues related to missing variables, and
endogeneity and offer natural experiments as one solution.
Clark et al. reviews only some of discussion of the reliability of responses to happiness
surveys. Many happiness researchers consider SWB to reflect an individual’s true level
of utility with some noise included (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006). There is a
suggestion that true measurements of differences in happiness could get lost in
translation (Sen, 1999; Easterlin, 1974). A language barrier could come from using
different languages to describe happiness, or different definitions within the same
language (Easterlin, 1974; Sen, 1999). Sen (1999) suggests a more precise approach to
assessing wellbeing or utility levels between individuals would be more appropriate.
Due to subjective differences in definitions of happiness or welfare, interpersonal
comparisons of SWB might be essentially meaningless (Sen, 1999). Sen suggests an
approach that takes the results of an individual’s income and choice set into account as
opposed to a stated measure of happiness.
Kahneman and Deaton’s (2010) findings even further complicate the discussion of
using SWB to describe economic welfare. Kahneman and Deaton use data that allows
them to distinguish between the EWB and life evaluation of their subjects. Life
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evaluation is SWB as described thus far. EWB is measured with respondents’ answers
to questions about their emotional state at present, and in the recent past. The most
common example is, how many days a week do you usually feel depressed? In their
study of people living in the United States, Kahneman and Deaton find that EWB and
SWB are both positively correlated with increased income when controlling for other
possible determinants of wellbeing. However, Kahneman and Deaton find that once
household income reaches $75,000, increases in EWB plateau while SWB continues to
increase. If EWB and SWB diverge at $75,000 they could be measuring different latent
phenomena. Becker’s (1974) theory of a social income input to a consumer’s utility
may help explain the observations of Kahneman and Deaton. Perhaps SWB is
increased as income increases access to social income, and EWB is increased because
income increases concrete utility inputs, such as access to healthcare. Access to goods
like healthcare has diminishing marginal returns. Access to more social income may
not have diminishing marginal returns, or the returns may diminish at a slower rate.
This could explain the divergence of SWB and EWB observed by Kahneman and
Deaton. Whatever the explanation, Kahneman and Deaton’s results make clear that
while SWB is certainly related to income and utility, it should not be the only measure
considered when evaluating a policy change’s effect on welfare. Other measures, such
as EWB, should also be included
Helliwell (2006) approaches the the study of happiness and SWB from the standpoint
of social capital. This approach offers some interesting implications. Helliwell describes
social capital as the support network an individual has access to. Helliwell includes
observations on the importance of feeling involved in one’s society in order to increase
happiness. This involvement could be political or social. Helliwell also provides
evidence that workplace environment has a much greater effect on workers’ happiness
than their pay does. Helliwell highlights the importance of happiness studies and
investigations into measures of well-being, such as SWB and EWB. The importance is,
more and more of the studies related to well-being find that the impact of monetary
income is significantly less than that of other inputs, such as safety, education etc.
Helliwell points out that if this indeed the case, too much of economic thought and
research is devoted to income maximization.
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2.2.2 Empirical Studies of SWB and EWB
Empirical studies of SWB and EWB are relevant at both the macro and micro scales.
Deaton (2008) examines well-being around the world over time. Deaton uses data from
the Gallup Organization’s 2006 World Poll. This poll includes 132 countries, and was
most complete world poll to data at the time (Deaton, 2008). National average life
satisfaction varies greatly across the world, with richer countries like the United States
and Japan within the ranges of 7.5-8.5 (out of 10), to much lower life satisfaction in
other places, such as sub-Saharan Africa and Haiti with ranges of 3.1-4.5. Deaton finds
that higher per capital GDP continuously increases average life satisfaction across the
world without any leveling-off effect. Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) examine
relationships between income inequality and happiness inequality in the United States.
Their analysis uses data from the General Social Survey, using years 1972 to 2006.
Stevenson and Wolfers attempt to decompose aggregate happiness measures in order
to gain more insight into changes in happiness overtime in the United States. Using
variance as a measurement for happiness inequality, Stevenson and Wolfers find
happiness inequality declined in the United States until the early 1990’s, and then rose
again. This is interesting considering that throughout the years in their sample income
inequality continuously rose in the United States. They find a similar results after
decomposing happiness measures between racial groups. Stevenson and Wolfers find
that happiness inequality has actually decreased between racial groups in the United
States. This is also not in line with the increased levels of income inequality seen over
the same time period. The findings of Stevenson and Wolfers show that happiness
research is a living field, and that much remains unknown about the determinants of
measures of happiness. Another example of the macro approach to analysis of
happiness is Blanchflower and Oswald (2004). Blanchflower and Oswald also use data
from the General Social Survey, but they use the years 1972 to 1998. Blanchflower and
Oswald report the same general trend of decreasing happiness as Stevenson and
Wolfers. They highlight that this decrease has been especially hard on women, and
Black Americans have actually experienced happiness increases. They also find a U
shaped relationship between happiness and age. In an effort to broaden the scope of
their analysis, Blanchflower and Oswald also include data from Great Britain. They
use survey data from the Eurobarometer Survey from the years 1973 to 1998. The
data from Great Britain reveals patterns that are similar to those of the United States.
Blanchflower and Oswald find that many non-monetary covariates have dramatic
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effects on happiness levels. Some of these include years of education and marital
status. That being said, income is still highly influential on level of happiness.
Happiness decreases with age until a person reaches their 30’s, then happiness begins
to improve again. Large scale analysis of the determinants of happiness, such as these
studies, provides an important baseline for studies concerning happiness. The above
studies make clear the any study concerned with happiness needs to control for
individual characteristics well beyond income. Sex, race, education and marital status
are only a few of the covariates found to be important in these empirical studies.
Happiness or well-being are also studied at the household level. Bookwalter and
Dalenberg (2004) and Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2010) both study different
household factors’ impact on individual SWB. These studies examine household survey
data from South Africa. This makes them indispensable in forming a research strategy
for this thesis. Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2004) and Bookwalter and Dalenberg
(2010) use data collected by the South African Labour and Development Research
Unit. These data were collected in late 1993 and early 1994, and are consider
representative of South Africa at the time. Although these papers are useful to my
research due to their country of study, both papers contribute to the broader empirical
discussion of modeling and understanding SWB. The research of Bookwalter and
Dalenberg (2004) focuses on investigating the functionality of the, so called,
‘bottom-up’ approach to modeling SWB. This approach is inspired by the observations
of Sen (1999), and others, that well-being or SWB is influenced by the abilities and
freedoms one enjoys both economic and civil. The ‘bottom-up’ approach, as described
by Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2004), suggests that having certain freedoms or abilities
available to a person will influence their SWB more than anything else. From a
functional stand-point, this means modeling SWB using inputs such as housing type,
access to running water or indoor plumbing or transportation options would be more
effective than using a model focused on income. Indeed, Bookwalter and Dalenberg
(2004) find that within their model the most important inputs ended up being
available transportation modes, durable goods owned by the household and household
sanitation. In the specific and broader contexts, Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2004)
show that using factors beyond traditional economic inputs and outputs is helpful
when modeling SWB. One could theorize the same would hold true for EWB. In their
2010 article, Bookwalter and Dalenberg use the same data, but expand the scope of
the analysis to focus on relative economic status as a determinant of SWB in South
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Africa. They include measures of household wealth with respect to the wealth of the
sampling cluster the household resides in. This allows for the identification of two
separate impacts of relative standing on SWB. The first impact is, being in a cluster of
higher wealth increases SWB for non-whites, and the other impact is, if a person felt
they are less wealthy than their parents they are more likely to have lower levels of
SWB. Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2004) and Bookwalter and Dalenberg (2010) both
offer important guidance in how to construct an empirical model of SWB. Their
guidance is most likely also relevant to a model of EWB.
These empirical studies of EWB and SWB all show the importance of income.
However, a common theme among these studies is the importance of non-monetary
inputs in models of happiness. In order to model empowerment’s relationship to EWB
and SWB, I included numerous covariates related to personal characteristics. These
covariates will hopefully add validity to my model.
2.3 Gender Empowerment
2.3.1 Gender Equality and Economic Development
Women are a group that have not been equal benefactors of society’s gains in wealth
and well-being until relatively recently. There is growing body of economic literature
that studies historical and present day issues related to gender in economics. Goldin
(2006) examines women’s journey from “secondary workers”, making their labor
decisions within the context of their husband’s labor decisions, to workers who choose
to work, and identify with their careers. Goldin (2006) discusses many important
issues related to gender empowerment, but the most important take away is the
importance of motivation behind labor choices. Goldin (2006) points out that higher
female employment is not necessarily an indicator of women’s increased status in the
household or society at large. Although equal representation of women in the
workplace is necessary for a equitable society, it is not sufficient. In order for
employment to imply gender equality, employment must be a choice women make
independent of their husbands or partners or economic situation. Goldin and Katz
(2002) examine the impact of access to oral contraceptives had on women in the
United States. Using a difference-in-difference model, Goldin and Katz (2002) find
that single women’s access to oral contraceptives coincided with a 0.021 decrease in the
proportion of women who were married by the age of 23, and a 0.032 decrease in the
proportion of women married by the age of 17. Oral contraceptives can also account
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for between 1.2 and 1.6 of the overall 1.7 percentage point increase in women employed
as lawyers or doctors from 1970 to 1990. Goldin (2006) and Goldin and Katz (2002)
focus on women in the United States, but there are elements of the continued struggles
of women that are shared internationally. This makes research like Goldin (2006) and
Goldin and Katz (2002) pertinent to any study of gender and gender inequality,
whatever the location. The reason the research of Goldin (2006) and Goldin and Katz
(2002) pertain to study of South Africa is the common denominator of gender equality
and female empowerment: decision-making. Access to birth control can enhance
female decision-making abilities. Increased involvement in the economy can also
enhance female decision-making ability. As I previously stated, Kabeer’s (2005)
research, which is specifically concerned with international gender equality, considers
the most fundamental measure of empowerment to be the ability to make choices.
Kabeer highlights that the ability to make decisions is improved by access to
education, access to paid work and political representation. These could be considered
some of the pillars of a gender equitable society. Although gender equality is far from
perfect in the developed world, research in economics and other fields often focus on
the developing world when studying determinants and impacts of gender
empowerment. There is a significant literature discussing the positive impacts
increased female empowerment can have on the development of nations.
The relationship between development economics and female empowerment is reviewed
by Duflo (2011). Duflo includes important discussion relating to the bi-directional
relationship between female empowerment and economic development. Economic
development seems to contribute to gender equality, and gender equality seems to
contribute to economic development. Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009) is an
example of research supporting the former. Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney study the
effects of changes in maternal mortality in Sri Lanka between 1946 and 1953.
Reductions in maternal mortality over this period increased the life expectancy of girls,
and increased access to education for girls (Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney, 2009).
The conceptual framework used by Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney is a little dark,
but does explain the change. Essentially, as maternal mortality declined, women where
more likely to contribute more to a family or community because they were expected
to live longer. If women are expected to live longer, then investing in their education
as girls is a more economically attractive choice (Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney,
2009). The changes in female mortality in Sri Lanka at the time were largely driven by
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increased access to drugs and treatments from the developed world. Kabeer and Goldin
(2006) suggest that this increase in access to education for girls in Sri Lanka will lead
to a generation of more empowered women. So, Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney is a
clear example of how economic development can directly cause increases in female
empowerment. Duflo and Breierova (2004) offer some more evidence of the
development leading to empowerment relationship. Duflo and Breierova take
advantage of a large national policy to increase school construction in Indonesia during
the 1970’s. This policy serves as the exogenous variation needed to estimate a causal
relationship between increased female education and age of first marriage and early
fertility. Duflo and Breierova find that female education levels are a more important
determinant of their child’s age of first marriage than male levels of education. This is
to say, whether or not a women is educated has a greater impact on her life than
whether or not a man is educated. Duflo and Breierova’s study is predicated on a
61,807 school expansion in Indonesia from 1973-1979. Their study shows, as Indonesia
developed, it afforded more opportunity for girls to become educated, which then led
to the age at which they were first married or first gave birth to increase. Duflo and
Breierova is another case of a country’s increased development giving women an
opportunity to gain empowerment in their society. Another area of development
geared at empowering women that has garnered much attention is the institution of
micro-credit programs. Pitt et al. (2006) study the effects of access to micro-credit on
female empowerment at the household level. Using data from household survey data
from Bangladesh collected in 1991 and 1992, Pitt et al. find that access to micro-credit
programs is associated with an increase in measures of empowerment for landless
women. Pitt et al.’s (2006) research represents a little of both views on the direction of
the relationship between empowerment and development. On one hand, increasing
access to micro-credit could be viewed as economic development, and this economic
development empowers women. On the other hand, these women are empowered to
participate in their economy more effectively, and this is likely to develop their
communities even further. Although Pitt et al. studies development through
micro-credit programs as a means to empowering women, the scope of their study is
also an example of the interwoven nature of development and empowerment.
Thomas (1990) is an example of research offering evidence of female empowerment
contributing to development. Using household bargaining models and survey data
from Brazil in the years 1974 and 1975, Thomas examines the validity of household
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bargaining models, gender bias within household resource allocation and the
differential effects of female spending and male spending on a household. Thomas finds
that households in which women hold a greater share of disposable income often have
children with better anthropomorphic health measures. In this case, women who have
more access to household income, or greater levels of empowerment, use their
empowerment to better the health of their children. A healthier populous is generally
regarded as a more productive populous. It is safe to say that as health outcomes
improve at the household level, economic development of a country is expedited. This
is how Thomas supports the empowerment leading to development side of the economic
development - female empowerment relationship. Branisa et al. (2013) take a more
direct approach to studying the direction of the relationship between empowerment
and development by examining the the effects of social institutions that to promote
gender inequality, e.g., certain religious organizations, on economic development at the
country level. Branisa et al. find that the presence and intensity of social institutions
that promote gender inequality are associated with lower measures of gender
empowerment at the country level. These measures of gender empowerment are
constructed from measures of education, civil rights and professional opportunities for
women. Branisa et al. argue that if countries are interested in spurring development
they must address gender inequality promoted by certain social institutions first. By
promoting gender equality countries could expedite their development process (Branisa
et al., 2013). Many of the examples of evidence of the direction of the relationship
between empowerment and development, especially Branisa et al. and Pitt et al., show
that although there is some evidence of one direction or the other, the relationship
between empowerment and economic development is dynamic to say the least.
Part of the goal of this research is to actually motivate a broader perspective on the
relationship between women, empowerment and economic development. Specifically,
development policies should as be evaluated carefully to make sure they are having the
desired effect. Balasubramanian (2013) provides an example of why some development
policies can actually hurt women. As was discussed by Pitt et al. (2006), empowering
women through micro-credit programs can lead to gender equality in the household,
and allow women to participate in and grow their community’s economy.
Balasubramanian takes a different perspective using the same intrahousehold
bargaining framework. Balasubramanian theorizes, under the threat point models of
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), women can be left worse
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off once they gain access to micro-credit. In a circumstance where divorce is not an
option, or the social consequences of divorcing are sufficiently negative, a women’s
threat point in her marriage could reach zero. This means that because the result of
divorcing has such a great negative impact on a woman’s utility she will endure any
amount of personal hardship within her marriage. Balasubramanian claims this is the
case within many communities in South Asia. Balasubramanian suggests that if
women are asked by their husbands to take out micro-credit loans on their behalf, it is
in their best interest to comply. This includes situations in which a women knows her
husband will take the money, use it for his own interests and never assist her in
repayment. This would leave a women in debt without actually ever receiving any
financing. Balasubramanian also suggests that micro-credit agencies hold enough
social power in communities to compel these women to repay their loans even if their
husbands steal the money. Although Balasubramanian doesn’t offer any empirical
support of this theory, it is certainly theoretically sound within the observed social
structure of Southern Asia and the Manser and Brown and McElroy and Horney
threat point model. Balasubramanian offers a reminder that although empowered
women clearly can help their communities reach higher levels of development, some
development strategies aimed at helping women can actually put them at risk.
2.3.2 Measuring Empowerment
Studies of gender empowerment have the arduous task of identifying a relatively
hidden variable. Gender empowerment usually needs to be revealed, as opposed to
directly observed by researchers. This is because the reliability of responses on surveys
concerning a woman’s level of empowerment is likely correlated with a woman’s level of
empowerment. In other words, unempowered women may be risking physical or
psychological harm by revealing the power structure in their household to an outsider
or researcher. Empowered women will likely be more than willing and able to share
their level of empowerment. This will likely cause levels of empowerment to be
overestimated.
One way to reveal empowerment is to take advantage of exogenous shocks to
households. It is common for households to engage in consumption smoothing when
they are subject to negative or positive income shocks. During this smoothing process
the ranking of the needs of girls relative to boys may be different. This difference can
result in different health outcomes and different mortality rates for men and women.
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Using data from India, Rose (1999) finds empirical evidence of a relationship between
shocks to household incomes and female survival rates. Other descriptive variables
such as mother’s education, landholdings and availability of education are also
associated with differences in male and female mortality, and are controlled for in the
study. The heterogeneous effects of an increase in household income are largely the
result of a household’s intrahousehold bargaining structure. Income shocks are
estimated using rainfall data. Using these exogenous shocks allows for one method of
observing a household’s intrahousehold bargaining structure.
In order to identify different levels of gender empowerment, it is often advantageous for
researchers to attempt to observe behavior that results in less than Pareto efficient
outcomes for individuals or households. One such example, Udry (1996), seeks to
measure the loss of productivity in farming households in Burkina Faso resulting from
gender biased allocation of household factors of production. Udry finds factors of
agricultural production are not spread between male, and female farmers within a
household in a Pareto efficient manner. By comparing the yields of agricultural plots
tended by female household members with an estimated average yield of a similar plot,
Udry finds female tended plots produce on average less than an average plot and less
than an average male tended plot. Once the distribution of household resources is
taken into account, Udry presents evidence that the difference in yields can be
attributed to male household members using more of the available factors of
agricultural production for their plots. Furthermore, Udry claims this is not a utility
maximizing trade off. Male farmers overuse household factors of production to the
point at which their marginal contribution to the yield is less than if these factors were
employed by the female household members. Udry’s study exemplifies many studies of
the household related to gender, because the dispersion of household resources between
the genders is the primary explanatory variable used in the analysis. This method can
be employed when explaining production or consumption within a household.
Consumption choices are commonly used to reveal evidence of bias in household
expenditures. For example, Deaton (1989) uses household expenditure data to measure
any difference between household expenditure on girls and boys in Thailand and Côte
d’Ivorie. Deaton considers that an increase in the number of children in a household
could be compared to a decrease in adult income as resources must be diverted to the
new child. Deaton constructs the ratio, πir, for various goods, x, for the households in
the sample using the formula shown below.
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πir =
δpiqi/δnr
δpiqi/δx
· nr
x
(1)
In the formula, piqi is household i’s total expenditure and nr is the number of people
of gender category r in the household. As Deaton further explains, a value of -0.5 for
πir for an additional girl means that the reduction in spending on good x associated
with this additional girl entering the household corresponds to the spending reduction
that would accompany a 50% decrease in income. If good x is an adult good like
tobacco or alcohol then the πir ratios associated with additional boys and girls could
be compared. If πir is more negative for boys relative to girls, the household exhibits
favoritism towards boys. The πir ratios are estimated using an empirical Engel curve.
The results from Côte d’Ivorie and Thailand do not show a statistically significant
difference in the spending allocated towards boys and girls. Deaton does observe a
difference between the πir ratios of men and women in the 15 to 55 age group in Côte
d’Ivorie by analyzing male exclusive and female exclusive goods. This method of
identifying gender biased behavior within households has been widely applied because
it uses consumption habits reported on household surveys, which are more reliable
than stated household structure.
Under the right circumstances, researchers can get a more direct view into the
intrahousehold decision-making process. Some survey instruments are very specific to
household decision-making. This allows for easier analysis of the gender relationships
within a household. Frankenberg and Thomas (2001) provides insight into the
construction of survey instruments of this type. The findings of Frankenberg and
Thomas can be used as a template for survey design or as a resource for interpreting
surveys that may not be directly concerned with empowerment or household
decision-making. Frankenberg and Thomas report on the development of a
decision-making module for the 1997 and 1998 Indonesia Family Life Survey. Their
survey module examines household decision-making using three batteries of questions.
The three areas of focus are concerned with how couples deal with money, how couples
make decisions about spending and time use and what the relative standing of the
husbands and wives is within the household. Frankenberg and Thomas also analyze
the results of their survey module. They find results that are not surprising. Increased
levels of education for both household members increase the amount of money the
female household member is able keep under her own control. Also, increased
education for women is related to increased control of household food expenditures.
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Frankenberg and Thomas show that direct questions about household structure can
reveal information about the effects and determinants of female empowerment. Pitt et
al. (2006) use a factor analytic approach in their study of micro-credit and female
empowerment in Bangladesh. Their factor analysis uses results of direct questioning
about the household decision-making process and other empowerment related issues,
similar to the analysis of Frankenberg and Thomas. Pitt et al. examine 9 different
latent factors representing empowerment in different contexts. These range from
simple purchasing power in the household to fertility choices and involvement in
community activism. I use an approach to empowerment measurement similar to that
of Frankenberg and Thomas and Pitt et al.. Direct observation of empowerment has
its drawback. As I mentioned earlier, women who are unempowered may be unwilling
to report that they are unempowered due to the fear of harm from their husbands.
However, a factor analytic approach like that of Pitt et al. may be able to more
directly reveal empowerment by analyzing questions that only skirt the edges of these
issues and still allow unempowered women to answer freely and safely.
Agarwal (1997) points out an important caveat to many of the studies of gender
empowerment within economics. Agarwal argues that the research related to gender
empowerment limits the scope of study to the household. This is problematic because
there may be external limits to empowerment imposed by social norms (Agarwal,
1997). It is worth noting that although Agarwal writes from 1997, most of the more
recent literature I have encountered related to female empowerment is still only
focused on the household. Agarwal argues that even if women are more powerful in
their households, if they live in a society that is largely inequitable their household
bargaining power will have exogenous limitations. Agarwal offers an important
reminder that gender relations are multifaceted in even the simplest of cases. Drawing
broad conclusions about the effects or determinants of gender empowerment based
solely on household level observation could be problematic.
After reviewing existing empirical research concerning intrahousehold bargaining,
gender empowerment and EWB and SWB, I have chosen data and empirical methods
that should effectively explore the relationship between EWB and SWB and gender
empowerment. These choices are informed both by the existing research in the field
and by the gaps in the research that exist.
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3 Institutional Background
3.1 Climate and Geography
South Africa covers a land area of about 472,281 square miles. The country’s coastlines
rise sharply up to a plateau that consists of approximately two thirds of the country’s
land. Within this plateau, there are four geographic areas that are commonly described
using the Dutch word ‘veld.’ These areas are called the High Veld, the Bush Veld, the
Low Veld and the Middle Veld. These areas range from about 6,000 to 2,000 feet
above sea level. Figure 1 should provide some reference for this section. (Beck, 2014)
There are three major rivers in South Africa, the Orange, Vaal and the Limpopo. The
Orange River is the longest river in South Africa running about 1,300 miles along the
border of South Africa and Namibia. Rainfall in eastern South Africa averages about
35-40 inches annually, the High Veld receives 15-30 inches of rainfall annually and the
Northwestern Cape is much dryer, receiving about 5 inches of rainfall annually. The
Cape peninsula receives about 22 inches of rain from the Atlantic Ocean. This allows
the Cape peninsula to support heavy agriculture. The temperatures in Durban, on the
southeastern coast, are often highest averaging between 50 and 75 degree Fahrenheit
during the winter months. During the summer the temperature in Durban ranges from
around 70 to 80 degrees. Cape Town, on the southern tip, tends to be the coolest city
in the country. With winter temperature ranging between 45 and 65 degrees. Summer
temperatures tend to be between 60 and 80 degrees. Snow is usually only seen in
regions of higher elevation. (Beck, 2014)
South Africa is home to exceptional biodiversity in both plants and animals. The Cape
Floral Kingdom, an area of South Africa along the Atlantic and Indian oceans meeting
at the Cape of Good Hope, is reported to contain the most species of flower per acre of
anywhere in the world. South Africa is home to grasslands on the plateaus, rain forests
in the Eastern Low Veld, prairie in the High Veld and savanna in the Bush Veld. In
terms of animals, South Africa is home to many of animals the African continent is
famous for. These include hippopotami, elephants, lions and zebras. South Africa’s
Kruger National Park is a 7,523 square mile game reserve on the border of
Mozambique. This is the oldest and most well known game reserve in South Africa.
(Beck, 2014)
2http://www.africa-continent.com/south-africa.htm
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Figure 1: Map of South Africa2
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3.2 History
South African history stretches back to the dawn of humanity. There has been
extensive archaeological investigations throughout Africa and South Africa. Many of
the predecessors of modern humans resided in South Africa. These include,
Australopithecus africanus, Homo habilis and Homo erectus. South Africa became an
attractive home to modern humans, Homo sapians sapians, after climate change
reduced the amount of inhabitable land across Africa. One area early humans could
and did survive was the southern coast of South Africa. The San people of South
Africa, often called Bushmen by Europeans, are the modern day descendants of these
‘original’ South Africans. The San people lived predominantly as hunter-gatherers. A
San group, the Khoikhoi, did domesticate animals, but neither group were agrarian.
(Beck, 2014)
The Khoikhoi were one of the first groups to suffer as a result of European contact. As
early as 1652, South Africa’s Cape Town was used as a stopping point for Dutch
traders on trade routes between the Netherlands and Asia. The Khoikhoi suffered from
violence and disease that accompanied the Dutch traders. Some Dutch traders became
settlers, and began farming throughout South Africa. Over the years, South Africa was
tossed between European countries and endured significant hardship as a results. The
country was considered strategically significant, but Europeans where otherwise fairly
uninterested. Once diamonds were discovered in South Africa in 1867, creation of
European settlements and European immigration increased. South Africa fell under
British rule in 1902 after the Second South African War. This rule continued through
Apartheid, established in 1948. Apartheid is one of the most well known instances of
mass state driven racism in human history. Under Apartheid, marriages between
people of different races were illegal, sexual relations between people of different races
were illegal and races were segregated into certain living areas. There were vocal and
violent protests to Apartheid. This time in South Africa saw mass arrests, mass
imprisonments and police brutality and, less frequently, state sanctioned murders. The
grips of Apartheid began to loosen through the 1960’s and early 1970’s. Changes in
the economy made business owners desire more workers. This led to Black Africans
filling jobs that were officially ‘White’ jobs. Struggles continued and Black Africans
continued to suffer under White rule. Eventually the need for more workers as well as
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pressure from within and outside of South Africa became too strong. Apartheid
officially ended after majority elections were held in 1994.3 (Beck, 2014)
3.3 Economy
South Africa is classified as middle-income emerging market. Economically, South
Africa has endured hardship. The estimated unemployment rate was 25.9% in 2015
and 35.9% of the country was living below the poverty line in 2012. With a GDP of
$724 Billion in 2015, South Africa ranks about 31st in the world for economy size.4
President Thabo Mbeki, who was in office from 1999 to 2008, receives criticism and
praise for his economic policies. Although the country’s economy did grow relatively
well during his tenure, this growth included the loss of many industrial jobs which
increased unemployment among lower skilled workers. Jacob Zuma, the current
president of South Africa also garners criticism for his economic policies.5
There is a significant migrant labor population in South Africa, specifically in the
mining industry. The current migrant labor system is probably a result of a the
historical migrant labor system that evolved due to a need introduced by some early
20th century racially discriminatory laws regarding land use. These laws restricted the
amount of land available to African Blacks and forced many young men to travel in
order to find work in mines.6 This migrant labor system continues to put significant
stress on the migrant laborers and their families. (Beck, 2014)
The average exchange rate in 2008 for U.S. dollars South African Rands was $1 to 8.25
R. In the empirical section I use household level monthly income and spending. These
values are displayed in 10,000 R’s. As a point of reference, 10,000 R’s was about
$1212.65 in 2008.7
3.4 South African People
Studying gender empowerment and SWB and EWB in South Africa offers an
opportunity for research within the context of a very diverse population. The
population consists of Black Africans: 80.2%, Whites: 8.4%, Coloureds:8 8.8% and
Indians/Asians 2.5%. South Africans enjoy complete freedom of religion, and their
3https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html
4https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html
5http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21684158-nation-brink-deserves-better-jacob-zuma-try-
again-beloved-country?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8561b012f603b9fd9577f0e
6http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/land-labour-and-apartheid
7http://www.usforex.com/forex-tools/historical-rate-tools/historical-exchange-rates
8Coloured is an official term used in South Africa to describe people of mixed ethnic ancestry
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government is secular. The 2001 census describes the population’s religious choices as:
Protestant 36.6% (Zionist Christian 11.1%, Pentecostal/Charismatic 8.2%, Methodist
6.8%, Dutch Reformed 6.7%, Anglican 3.8%), Catholic 7.1%, Muslim 1.5%, other
Christian 36%, other 2.3%, unspecified 1.4% and none 15.1%.9 Most of the South
African people live in the eastern half of the country. This is due to the eastern area’s
resource rich soil and other economic opportunities. About one third of people in
South Africa live in an urban area. There has been a general trend of movement
toward urban areas since the end of Apartheid in 1994. This is due to the lifting of
certain restrictions on movement within the country. South Africa maintains 11 official
languages. According to the 2011 census, 22.7% of South Africans speak Zulu, 16%
speak Xhosa, 13.5% speak Afrikaans, 9.6% speak English, 9.1% speak Northern Sotho,
8% speak Tswana, 7/6% speak Southern Sotho, 4.5% speak Tsonga, 2.5% speak Swazi,
2.4% speak Venda, 2.1% speak Nedebele and the remaining 1.6% speak other
languages. South Africa’s population is wonderfully diverse in language, ethnicity and
religion. (Beck, 2014)
3.5 Gender Equality
The South African government states its desire for legal gender equality in its
constitution. Section 9 of Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights, of the Constitution of South
African includes, “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital
status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” Constitutional guarantees of legal
sexual equality are present in about 85% of world constitutions.10 This is not to
suggest that due to the presence of this constitutional amendment gender equality is
not an issue of concern in South Africa.11,12 Violence against women and equal access
to resources remain major problems. (Beck, 2014)
9https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html
10http://www.aclumaine.org/us-lagging-behind-when-it-comes-gender-equality
11https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html
12http://www.sahistory.org.za/womens-struggle-1900-1994/women-new-democracy
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4 Data
4.1 Data Sources
I use data from the South Africa National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) Wave 1 for
my empirical analysis. These data are survey data from a representative sample of
private households and people living in workers’ hostels, convents and monasteries in
all nine provinces of South Africa in 2008. The sampling method is a stratified,
two-stage cluster design. 409 sampling units were randomly selected from a total of
3,000 sampling units created in South Africa for previous research. Within each of
these 409 selected sampling units, there are 8 sub units. Previous surveys had not used
2 of the 8 sub units in each of the larger sampling units. These 2 previously unused
sub units did not geographically overlap, and could be used in this survey.
The target population of the sample is private households and people living in workers’
hostels, convents and monasteries in all nine provinces in South Africa. This excludes
collective living situations such as student hostels, old age homes and prisons. During
Wave 1, fieldworkers attempted to survey 10,642 households, and were successful with
7,305 households. The final dataset from Wave 1 includes data from 7,296 of those
households. Questionnaires for 31,141 people were gathered. Some of these responses
are surveys by proxy. Of these 31,141 people 7,032 identify as resident heads of
households, 3,208 spouses of heads of households, 10,794 children of heads of household
and 5,580 grandchildren of heads of household.
In order to best understand the relationships between SWB, EWB and empowerment I
chose between four subsets of the NIDs data I created. The first subset consists of all
adults with complete observations of covariates, the second subset is all women in the
data, the third subset is all women who are the partner or spouse of the head of
household and the fourth subset consists of women who are married. My primary
analysis is reserved to the subset of all women in these data. I made this choice based
on that fact that my primary interest is how women react to higher levels of
empowerment. Including men in the dataset could introduce unnecessary noise. The
other two subsets suffered from low numbers of observations. I use the other subsets
for specificity and robustness checks.
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Figure 2: SWB Bar Plot
4.2 Data Descriptions
Table 1 displays the summary statistics for pertinent variables for all women within
the NIDS data with full observations. There are 5,339 observations for all variables.
Figure 2 displays a bar plot of the SWB variable. This bar plot shows that SWB
follows a distribution that is relatively normal.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Min Mean Median Max IQR Std. Dev.
Age 15 44.48 43 102 26 17.42
EWB -4.08 0 0.19 1.26 1.45 1.08
SWB 1 5.34 5 10 3 2.42
Empowerment -0.98 0 -0.68 1.03 2.01 0.98
Income 0 0.47 0.22 13.7 0.32 0.83
Food Spending 0 0.09 0.07 1.48 0.07 0.08
Non-Food Spending 0 0.22 0.05 12.03 0.14 0.58
Happy 1 2.67 3 4 2 1.06
n = 5,339
Table 1 shows that SWB has a mean of 5.34 with a minimum of 1 and maximum of 10.
The median is 5 which is close to the mean, which also suggests symmetry. SWB has a
standard deviation of 2.42 and an interquartile range (IQR) of 3. There seems to be
sufficient variation in SWB. Figure 3 shows that the EWB factor scores are left skewed
and not very normal, however, they are generally mound shaped. The mean of the
EWB scores is zero with a minimum of -4.08 and a maximum of 1.26. The median is
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Figure 3: EWB Factor Score Density
0.19. The mean and median are similar which is a good sign of relative symmetry. The
standard deviation is 1.08 and the IQR is 1.45. Both of these statistics suggests there
is enough variation in EWB to use regression analysis. Figure 4 shows the distribution
of the empowerment factor scores. The distribution is bi-modal with a peak at about
-1 and at about 1. The bi-modal nature of the empowerment score may be a reflection
of insufficient variation in the empowerment inputs. This means that although there is
a lot of variation within each of the inputs, women might essentially fall into one of
two categories, empowered or unempowered. The distribution of the empowerment
factor scores may create problems in regression analysis. I will address this issues more
in the results section. The empowerment scores have a mean of 0. The median of -0.68
is quite different from the mean, which stems from the non-normal distribution. The
scores vary from -0.98 to 1.03 with an IQR of 2.01 and a standard deviation of 0.98.
Although these data follow a bi-modal distribution, at least there is a decent amount
of variation. Figure 5 displays a bar plot of the responses to the survey question
concerning happiness. The bar plot also shows that more women were in the higher
happiness categories than lower happiness categories. The plot also shows that there
are many women in each category. The happiness variable is used as a EWB proxy in
my regression analysis. The bar plot suggests that this variable has enough variation
to use in regression analysis. Whether or not a woman is the main decision-maker in
her home in the realm of day to day expenses is used as a proxy variable. Figure 6
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Figure 4: Empowerment Factor Score Density
Figure 5: Happiness Response Bar Plot
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Figure 6: Main Daily Spending Response Bar Plot
displays a bar plot of distribution of this variable. Figure 6 shows that many women
are in both category. More women identify themselves as the main decision-maker in
their home than do not, but I do not think the distribution is too unequal. There are
plenty of observations in both categories. Figure 7 shows the distribution of women in
each happiness category while also indicating their decision-making status. Figure 7
shows that women who are main decision-makers tend to be in one of the top three
categories of happiness more often than the lowest category. The most noticeable
difference between the two subgroups is in the happy 1-2 days a week category. This
difference may drive a result of making women who are the main decision-makers in
day-to-day spending appear to be more unhappy. Women in the data are between the
ages of 15 and 102 as shown in Table 1. The mean age of 44.48 and median age of 43
are close enough to suggest relative symmetry. The IQR of 26 and standard deviation
of 17.42 show that the sample contains women of varying ages. This is preferred
because this study is aimed at women in general. More variation in age will allow the
results to be interpreted more generally. Household income is shown in 10,000’s R, and
is disaggregated to monthly household income. Income varies from less than 0.00004 to
13.7. The median is 0.22 and mean is 0.47. The differences in the mean and median,
especially because income is displayed in 10,000’s R, shows that the income distribution
is right skewed. This is not surprising due to the known income inequalities in South
Africa. Income does vary quite a bit with an IQR of 0.32 and a standard deviation of
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Figure 7: Happiness by Main Daily Spending Bar Plot
0.83. These statistics suggest these data contain a good sample of household of
different incomes. Monthly household food spending is also displayed in 10,000’s R.
Food spending varies from less than 0.00004 to 1.48. The median of 0.07 and mean of
0.09 suggest that food spending is less skewed than monthly income, but still skewed
to the right. Food spending has an IQR of 0.07 and a standard deviation of 0.08.
These statistics show that there is ample variation in monthly household food spending
in the sample. Monthly household non-food spending is also displayed in 10,000’s R.
Non-food spending varies from 0.00004 to 12.03. The median of 0.05 and mean of 0.22
show that non-food spending is also highly skewed to the right. This also makes sense
given the known income inequality in South Africa. The IQR of 0.14 and standard
deviation 0.58 show that there is ample variation in non-food spending in the sample.
Tables 2 and 3 display the means and standard deviations for the variables that serve
as inputs when estimating latent empowerment and EWB factors. This is important
because variation in these variables creates variation in the empowerment or EWB
factor scores.
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Table 2: Empowerment Inputs
Mean Std. Dev.
Day to Day Expenses 0.56 0.4958
Large Unusual Purchase 0.49 0.5
Which School Children Attend 0.41 0.4926
Who Lives in Household 0.49 0.4999
Where Household Lives 0.49 0.4998
Table 3: EWB Inputs
Mean Std. Dev.
Unusually Bothered 1.58 0.8323
Trouble Focusing 1.65 0.8103
Depressed 1.78 0.8973
Everything an Effort 1.97 1.0027
Fearful 1.69 0.8497
Restless Sleep 1.82 0.9038
Lonely 1.66 0.841
Can’t Get Going 1.66 0.8419
5 Empirical Methods
5.1 Overview
In order to explore a relationship between gender empowerment and SWB and EWB, I
must construct measures for empowerment and EWB. Unfortunately, empowerment
and EWB are, by nature, not directly observable. The simplest measure of
empowerment available in the dataset is an indicator of whether or not a respondent
identifies themselves as the primary decision-maker in the realm of daily household
purchases. A simple measure of EWB is each respondent’s answer to the question:
about how many days do you feel happy each week? The responses are broken down
into the four categories: never, one to two days, three to five days and almost
everyday. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Ordinal Logistic Regression
(OLOGIT), these proxy variables, along with other covariates, can be regressed against
SWB and EWB, and a relationship can be measured. Using these proxy variables for
measures of EWB and empowerment may not capture the entire relationship being
examined, because each proxy could be too specific. In order to create more general
estimates of each respondent’s level of empowerment and EWB, I use polychoric
(POLY) and principal component (PCA) factor analysis.
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5.2 Factor Analysis
Tables 4 through 7 display the results of the POLY for empowerment and PCA for
EWB. The empowerment measure is constructed using five decision-making indicators.
These five indicators display if a women is the main decision-maker in her home in the
realms of daily spending, large purchases, where children attend school, who lives in
the household and where the household resides. These indicators are binary, which is
the reason for using POLY instead of factor analysis based on Pearson correlation.
The EWB measure is constructed from the answers to 8 four-item scale questions.
These questions measure how often a respondent has experience a specific feeling or
issue in a week. These include being unusually bothered, having trouble keeping ones’
mind focused, feeling depressed, feeling like everything is an effort, a respondent’s level
of fear, whether or not an individual is having restless sleep, how lonely the respondent
is and if they have trouble getting going. The resulting score will eventually be
multiplied by a negative so that it reflects EWB in terms of ‘happiness’, because the
chosen factor inputs map to lower levels of EWB. This factor analysis uses a
VARIMAX rotation. A VARIMAX rotation maximizes the variance of the factor
loadings (Abdi, 2003). I use a VARIMAX rotation, because factor loadings with
highest variance will produces factor scores with the highest variance. Factor scores
with higher variance should make multiple regression methods more effective.
PCA and POLY are statistical methods that assumes there is a latent factor causing
the observed variables to have the values they do. PCA routines in computer programs
like Stata measure how much of the within variance in the variance-covariance matrix
of the covariates can be explained by a certain number of factors (Acock, 2013). POLY
is almost the same but uses polychoric correlation instead of Pearson’s correlation.
Polychoric correlation is a modified estimate of correlation designed to be used for
ordinal or binary variables. Because the empowerment measures are binary, measuring
polychoric correlation is more appropriate. Factor analysis produces tables of
Eigenvalues that correspond to each factor assuming there is no latent factor. If there
is no latent factor each Eigenvalue would be unity. Tables 4 and 6 are tables of
Eigenvalues for each potential latent factor revealed in a factor analysis of observed
EWB and empowerment data. There are also scree plots of the Eigenvalues in Figures
8 and 9. These Eigenvalues are the summed squares of the factor loadings that are
assigned to each covariate based on how closely their variances match the assumed
number of latent factors. Higher factor loadings are considered better as they create
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higher Eigenvalues, and suggest a stronger relationship between the variables.
Generally speaking, if an Eigenvalue is less than 1.0, then the latent factor it measures
is unlikely to legitimately exist. If a factor loading value is less than 0.40, then that
covariate cannot be considered significantly related to the latent factor (Acock, 2013).
Another test of the robustness of factor analysis is Cronbach’s alpha. Researchers
consider a combined alpha value above 0.80 necessary, but not sufficient, for factor
analysis (Acock, 2013). Tables 5 and 7 include an estimate of these factors’ combined
Cronbach’s alpha.
Table 4 displays the Eigenvalues for the POLY of the empowerment variables. The
high Eigenvalue for the first factor supports my hypothesis that these variables indeed
represent a single latent factor. The scree plot displayed in Figure 8 also suggests these
inputs represent a single factor. Table 5 displays the factor loadings for resulting for
the POLY of the empowerment variables. All loadings exceed 0.40, implying these
variables are related to the single latent factor. Additionally, the combined Cronbach’s
alpha value exceeds 0.80, which provides more support for this factor analysis.
Table 4: Latent Empowerment Eigenvalues
Factor Loadings
Factor 1 4.14
Factor 2 0.48
Factor 3 0.24
Factor 4 0.11
Factor 5 0.03
Table 5: Latent Empowerment Factor Loadings with Cronbach’s alpha
Factor Loadings
Day to Day Expenses 0.978
Large Unusual Purchase 0.992
Which School Children Attend 0.859
Who Lives in Household 0.998
Where Household Lives 0.998
Alpha Value 0.947
Table 6 displays the Eigenvalues for the PCA of the EWB variables. The first
Eigenvalue is well above 1.0, and the remaining Eigenvalues are below 1.0. This
supports my hypothesis that these variables represent a single latent factor. The scree
plot in Figure 9 also provides evidence of a single latent factor. Table 7 displays the
factor loadings for the EWB variables. All the factor loadings exceed 0.40 and
Cronbach’s alpha exceeds 0.80.
37
Figure 8: Empowerment Factors Scree Plot
Figure 9: EWB Factors Scree Plot
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Table 6: Latent EWB Eigenvalues
Factor Loadings
Factor 1 3.84
Factor 2 0.88
Factor 3 0.73
Factor 4 0.68
Factor 5 0.52
Factor 6 0.49
Factor 7 0.47
Factor 8 0.39
Table 7: Latent EWB Factor Loadings with Cronbach’s alpha
Factor Loadings
Unusually Bothered 0.650
Trouble Focusing 0.725
Depressed 0.724
Everything an Effort 0.537
Fearful 0.614
Restless Sleep 0.593
Lonely 0.580
Can’t Get Going 0.659
Alpha Value 0.842
Factor scores are estimated for each individual using Bartlett’s scoring method.
Bartlett scores are unbiased, because they are estimated with maximum likelihood.
Bartlett’s scoring method is most likely to produce “true” estimates of the factor scores
(DiStefano et al., 2009). The Bartlett scores for these factors are produced with the
weights displayed in equations 2 and 3. These weights are applied to standardized
values of each input variable. These weights will become important for empirical
inference.
Empowerment Scorei = 0.0377 ·Daily Spendingi + 0.1089 · Large Spendingi
+0.0055 · Schooli + 0.4185 ·Who Livesi + 0.4335 ·Where Livesi
(2)
EWB Scorei = −1 · (0.1953 · Unusually Botheredi + 0.265 · Trouble Focusingi
+0.2637 ·Depressedi + 0.1307 · Everything An Efforti + 0.1708 · Fearfuli
+0.1587 ·Restless Sleepi + 0.1515 · Lonelyi + 0.2014 · Can′t Get Goingi)
(3)
It is worth noting that the questions with the highest weights for the empowerment
scores are related to who lives in the household and where the household resides. This
would suggest a respondent’s answer to these questions is the main driver of their
empowerment score. The EWB factors have weights that are more homogeneous. How
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often someone has trouble focusing and how often someone is depressed have the
highest weights. As previously stated, the EWB score is multiplied by a negative
because the factors in this case are actually indicating a lack EWB. Multiplying by a
negative correctly reverses the sign and meaning of the EWB factor score.
5.3 Empirical Strategy
With the the Nash bargaining model of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and
Horney (1981) in mind, I assume households have an explicit or implicit agreement of
how resources will be distributed. Men and women in each household have reached an
agreement of how to distribute resources, both physical goods and abstract resources
like time or freedom. In this way each woman’s utility, U , is a combination of welfare,
τ , and an unknown conversion factor, Θ.
U = Θ · τ (4)
τ is a function of x and y which are actual and abstract consumption goods,
respectively. An example of an abstract consumption good is membership in a local
women’s group.
τ = f(x, y) (5)
Actual resources x and abstract resources y are both functions of market prices, p,
wages, w, and empowerment, ξ.
x = g(p, w, ξ) (6)
y = h(p, w, ξ) (7)
Empowerment, ξ, is a function of φ, household bargaining structure, and, % personal
characteristics.
ξ = j(φ, %) (8)
Holding p and w constant,
δU
δξ
=
δτ
δξ
(9)
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We can then differentiate welfare in terms of empowerment.
δτ
δξ
=
δf(x, y)
δξ
(10)
δf(x, y)
δξ
=
δf
δx
δx
δξ
+
δf
δy
δy
δξ
(11)
We can then differentiate x and y in terms of ξ.
δx
δξ
=
δg(ξ; p, w)
δξ
=
δg
δξ
(12)
δy
δξ
=
δh(ξ; p, w)
δξ
=
δh
δξ
(13)
We can then substitute the results of the above differentiation into Equations 10 and
11.
δτ
δξ
=
δf
δx
δg
δξ
+
δf
δy
δh
δξ
(14)
In the final equation, the terms δf/δx · δg/δξ is the welfare change resulting from a
change in empowerment that provides a women more, or less, access to physical goods.
The pure empowerment effect is δfδy
δh
δξ , changes in τ resulting from access to abstract
goods. This is the effect I intend to measure. If consumption of abstract and physical
goods, as well as prices, income and personal characteristics are held constant through
regression,
δτ
δξ
=
δf
δy
δh
δξ
(15)
The model theoretically produces a measure of a change in empowerment’s pure effect
on a women’s welfare.
Allowing SWB and EWB to stand in for τ , the theoretical model can be formalized by
equations 16 and 17. Vectors X, Y, and Z are included in order to hold access to
goods, income and personal characteristics constant. Prices are considered constant.
SWBi = β0 + β1Empowermenti + β4Xi + β5Yi + β6Zi + εi (16)
EWBi = β0 + β1Empowermenti + β4Xi + β5Yi + β6Zi + εi (17)
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X = {Income, Spending,Belongings}
Y = {Marital Status, Parent′s Education, Perceived Wealth, Location,Ethnicity}
Z = {Tobacco Use,Alcohol Use, Perceived Health,Employment}
I begin the regression analysis with a simpler model that does not include the
aforementioned factor analysis. The first empirical model uses a simple indicator of
whether or not a women is the primary decision-maker in the realm of day-to-day
household purchases as a proxy for her empowerment. In order to estimate EWB, each
respondent’s happiness level is used as a proxy. I use OLS and OLOGIT to measure
these relationships.
After this initial analysis, I include factor scores in my regression models. Using the
factor scores as measures of empowerment, I use OLS and OLOGIT methods to
measure the effect empowerment has on SWB. I then use OLS to measure the effect
empowerment has on EWB. All regression analysis includes standard errors clustered
at the individual level in order to better account for individual level error variance.
The results of these regressions follow in Section 6.
6 Primary Empirical Results
6.1 SWB Primary Results
Table 8 displays the results of four regressions in which SWB is the dependent
variable. Models (1) and (2) use OLS to investigate the relationship between SWB and
the empowerment proxy and SWB and the empowerment factor score. Model (1)
explains about 32.4% of the variation in SWB. The main decision-maker variable
enters model (1) as significant at the 5% level. The p-value is approximately 0.01. This
p-value gives strong evidence of statistical significance. The value its the coefficient,
-0.174, implies that a women who is the main decision-maker in her home will have
lower level of SWB by 0.174 than a women who is otherwise the same, but is not the
main decision-maker in her home. This is not the expected result, however, such a
small reduction in SWB is probably not practically significant. The empowerment
factor score does not enter model (2) significantly. Its p-value, 0.115, does not imply
statistical significance even by the most liberal standards. Model (2) does not explain
any more of the variation in SWB than model (1). This is not surprising because the
only difference is the measurement of empowerment. Model (3) and (4) use OLOGIT
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Table 8: SWB
OLS OLS OLOGIT OLOGIT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SWB SWB SWB SWB
Empowerment Factor Score -0.0593 -0.0462
(0.115) (0.162)
Main decision-maker -0.174∗ -0.147∗
(0.010) (0.013)
Age -0.0308∗∗ -0.0329∗∗ -0.0285∗∗ -0.0304∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Age2 0.000372∗∗∗ 0.000390∗∗∗ 0.000348∗∗∗ 0.000365∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Income 0.0327 0.0312 -0.000875 -0.00202
(10,000’s R) (0.448) (0.470) (0.981) (0.957)
Household Food Expenditure 1.252∗ 1.305∗ 1.131∗∗ 1.176∗∗
(10,000’s R) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.0560 -0.0586 -0.00879 -0.0108
(10,000’s R) (0.416) (0.394) (0.869) (0.840)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.00544 0.00926 -0.0230 -0.0157
(0.976) (0.959) (0.881) (0.919)
Married 0.244 0.245 0.209 0.215
(0.123) (0.129) (0.121) (0.117)
Never Married 0.0672 0.0701 0.0639 0.0678
(0.684) (0.671) (0.653) (0.633)
Widow/Widower 0.155 0.152 0.116 0.113
(0.352) (0.362) (0.416) (0.428)
Above Average Income 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Average Income -0.476∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Below Average Income -1.555∗∗∗ -1.559∗∗∗ -1.492∗∗∗ -1.493∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Don’t Know 0.216 0.209 0.250 0.245
(0.299) (0.316) (0.198) (0.209)
Much Above Average Income 0.253 0.251 0.266 0.264
(0.336) (0.340) (0.240) (0.242)
Much Below Average Income -2.240∗∗∗ -2.244∗∗∗ -2.163∗∗∗ -2.166∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -0.187 -0.198 -0.201 -0.208
(0.733) (0.722) (0.644) (0.641)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head -0.284∗ -0.265∗ -0.258∗ -0.241∗
(0.033) (0.048) (0.026) (0.038)
Observations 5339 5339 5339 5339
R2 0.324 0.324
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.095
Root MSE 2.016 2.017
District Council FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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to investigate the relationship between SWB and the empowerment proxy and SWB
and the empowerment factor score. The main decision-maker variable enters into
model (3) significantly at the 5% level. The p-value, 0.013, is only slightly higher than
the OLS p-value. This p-value also offers strong evidence of statistical significance.
Table 9 displays the predicted distributions of the model with the main decision-maker
indicator set to 0 and 1. All other variables are set to their means. Although many
variables are indicators and their means are irrelevant, the results in table 9 are
reasonable approximations.
Table 9: Main decision-maker Marginal Effects At Means
SWB Main = 0 Main = 1 Marginal Change
1 0.0349 0.0401 +0.0052
2 0.0333 0.0379 +0.0046
3 0.0838 0.0938 +0.0070
4 0.1694 0.1823 +0.0129
5 0.2571 0.2596 +0.0025
6 0.1577 0.1499 −0.0078
7 0.1196 0.1093 −0.0103
8 0.0772 0.0687 −0.0085
9 0.0222 0.0195 −0.0027
10 0.0449 0.0370 −0.0079
In agreement with the negative sign on the coefficient in model (3), all of the marginal
changes in the lower five categories of SWB are positive, and all of the marginal
changes in SWB in the upper five categories are positive. These results are also the
opposite of what is expected, however, they are not practically significant. Only two
marginal changes show a change in distribution that is greater than 1 percentage
point. These marginal changes are in the 4 and 7 SWB categories. Furthermore, the
Pseudo R2 is only 0.095. The Pseudo R2 cannot be interpreted in the same way as the
R2 in OLS, however, such a low Pseudo R2 does suggest some problem with the model.
These models do not find evidence of a strong pure effect of empowerment on SWB.
The weak effect models (2) and (4) find has a negative sign when a positive is expected.
In order to better evaluate the models as a whole, we can examine the other results.
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) both found that
happiness and age display a U-shaped relationship. Blanchflower and Oswald found
that happiness tends to reach a minimum around the age of 30. All four of the models
show a U-shaped relationship between SWB and age. Model (1) suggests that SWB
reaches its minimum around the age of about 41, all else equal, and model (2) suggests
SWB reaches its minimum at around 42, all else equal. A household’s food
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expenditure enters into all four models significantly. Models (1) and (2) suggest a
10,000 R increase in household monthly food expenditures (1,212.65 2008 U.S. Dollars)
increases SWB by 1.252 and 1.305, respectively. These results are practically
significant in two ways. First of all, this confirms the model is correctly modeling SWB
when it comes to household food expenditure, almost all of the reviewed studies
related to SWB highlighted consumption as a determinant of SWB. Second of all, this
change in SWB is practically significant. Following the lead of Bookwalter and
Dalenberg (2010) I include information about relative income in the regressions. With
a base case of a respondent answering that their household is above average income,
categories of average income, below average income and much below average income
enter the model significantly, and negatively. Furthermore, the coefficient on much
below average income is about 1.79 times greater in absolute value than the coefficient
on household food expenditure. This also falls in line with the findings of Bookwalter
and Dalenberg. Finally, the indicator of whether or not a women is the spouse of the
head of household enters all four models significantly and negatively. Although the
effect is quite small, I think this result could be the basis for further research into
household structure and SWB.
Table 10 further investigates model (1) from Table 8. I chose to further investigate
model (1) over model (3) because the approximate p-value of the empowerment proxy
was slightly lower, 0.010 versus 0.013, and the sizes of the effect are relatively similar. I
also chose model (1) following the principle of parsimony. Model (1) uses OLS instead
of OLOGIT, barring the presence of other considerations, the relative simplicity of
model (1) makes it more attractive.
Models (1) through (4) in Table 10 display how results change as progressively more
controls are added. Model (1) contains no controls. The coefficient on the
decision-making variable is significant at the 5% level, however, the model only
accounts for about 0.1% of the variation in SWB. Model (2) sees the addition of
controls measuring personal characteristics such as their age, ethnicity and marital
status. The coefficient decreases by a factor of about 1.45. This is an interesting
change. Adding more covariates would usually reduce the absolute size of the
coefficient by accounting for unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with the
primary dependent variable. The p-value also decrease by factor 10. Age enters the
model in the same expected fashion seen in Table 8. Model (2) accounts for about
18.2% of the variation in SWB, a significant increase from model (1). Model (3) adds
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Table 10: SWB: Main Daily Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SWB SWB SWB SWB
Main decision-maker -0.171∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.169∗ -0.174∗
(0.010) (0.001) (0.015) (0.010)
Age -0.0375∗∗∗ -0.0317∗∗ -0.0308∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Age2 0.000486∗∗∗ 0.000378∗∗∗ 0.000372∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.0564 0.113 0.00544
(0.769) (0.536) (0.976)
Married 0.407∗ 0.294 0.244
(0.017) (0.070) (0.123)
Never Married 0.00768 0.0607 0.0672
(0.966) (0.721) (0.684)
Widow/Widower 0.117 0.160 0.155
(0.518) (0.350) (0.352)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head -0.242 -0.271∗ -0.284∗
(0.097) (0.050) (0.033)
Household Income 0.0435 0.0327
(10,000’s R) (0.302) (0.448)
Household Food Expenditure 0.983 1.252∗
(10,000’s R) (0.052) (0.014)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.0475 -0.0560
(10,000’s R) (0.487) (0.416)
Above Average Income 0 0
(.) (.)
Average Income -0.480∗∗∗ -0.476∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Below Average Income -1.515∗∗∗ -1.555∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Don’t Know 0.462∗ 0.216
(0.024) (0.299)
Much Above Average Income 0.322 0.253
(0.187) (0.336)
Much Below Average Income -2.200∗∗∗ -2.240∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -0.0873 -0.187
(0.907) (0.733)
Observations 5339 5339 5339 5339
R2 0.001 0.182 0.278 0.324
Root MSE 2.422 2.205 2.074 2.016
Personal Charcs. No Yes Yes Yes
Household Charcs. No No Yes Yes
Geo. FE No No No Yes
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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controls related to each women’s household, specifically, household monthly income
and monthly food and non-food expenditures and perceived relative income. The
addition of household information increase the R2 value to 0.278, another significant
change. The coefficient on the empowerment proxy then returns to a similar value as
model (1) and remains statistically significant at the 5% level. Model (4) is model (1)
from Table 8. Model (4) displays results after the addition of political district fixed
effects. The coefficient on the empowerment proxy is almost identical to the coefficient
in model (1). The p-values are approximately the same. The addition of geographic
fixed effects allows the model to explain about 32.4% of the variation in SWB.
The model improves with the progressive addition of the control variables. The lack of
change in the coefficient on the empowerment proxy paired with the significant
increase in the R2 suggests there is minimal bias included in coefficient in model (4).
One way to consider these results is by first considering the remaining 67.6% of
variation SWB that is not explained by model (4). It is possible this remaining 67.6%
represents variation that is correlated with the decision-making variable. If this is the
case, then the effect of decision-making on SWB reported in model (4) would change
or diminish as these currently unobserved variables were included. The results
displayed in Table 10 suggest the measured effect of the proxy variable is unbiased.
In order to further examine the results displayed in model (1) in Table 8, the
regression is repeated on subsets of data divided by household income quintiles. These
results are shown in Table 11. As can be seen in the models, the statistical significance
of the main decision-making variable diminishes once the data are subset by income
quintile. This result challenges the conclusion of unbiasedness shown by the results in
Table 10. If the model successfully predicts the relationship between the empowerment
proxy, then it ought to continue to measure this relationship among these subsets. A
potential counter to the evidence of bias, is the loss of statistical significance on the
age coefficients in all but model (4). The quadratic relationship between age and SWB
has been established (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). If
most of the models also lose significance on the age coefficient, then the loss of
significance on the empowerment proxy may not imply the relationship shown in
model (1) of Table 8 is invalid. Other interesting features of the models in Table 11
include, similar effects of being in different relative income groups regardless of income
quintile and a very large coefficient on household food expenditure in the bottom
quintile. Women living the bottom income quintile are probably struggling to feed
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Table 11: SWB By Income Quintiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quint 1 Quint 2 Quint 3 Quint 4 Quint 5
Main decision-maker -0.104 0.145 -0.185 -0.127 -0.167
(0.556) (0.395) (0.257) (0.402) (0.235)
Age -0.0163 -0.0331 -0.0409 -0.0628∗ -0.0221
(0.508) (0.114) (0.078) (0.012) (0.478)
Age2 0.000226 0.000336 0.000347 0.000649∗∗ 0.000426
(0.370) (0.091) (0.110) (0.010) (0.191)
Household Income 2.935 2.571 3.407 1.040 0.0907
(10,000’s R) (0.249) (0.420) (0.155) (0.253) (0.066)
Household Food Expenditure 10.43∗∗∗ 1.955 1.315 1.825 -0.727
(10,000’s R) (0.000) (0.387) (0.458) (0.154) (0.276)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.417 0.0111 0.381 0.165 -0.0472
(10,000’s R) (0.449) (0.984) (0.553) (0.474) (0.505)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.426 0.866∗ -0.944∗ -0.492 0.431
(0.272) (0.021) (0.017) (0.250) (0.321)
Married 0.488 0.851∗ -0.262 0.107 0.172
(0.167) (0.017) (0.481) (0.768) (0.584)
Never Married 0.401 0.640 -0.387 -0.200 0.349
(0.253) (0.063) (0.317) (0.613) (0.334)
Widow/Widower 0.425 0.710∗ -0.195 0.257 -0.300
(0.240) (0.044) (0.616) (0.523) (0.402)
Above Average Income 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Average Income -0.190 0.0157 -0.730∗ -0.487 -0.519∗∗
(0.702) (0.971) (0.019) (0.114) (0.002)
Below Average Income -1.484∗∗ -1.157∗∗ -1.777∗∗∗ -1.317∗∗∗ -1.430∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Don’t Know 0.817 1.179∗ -0.503 0.0358 -0.323
(0.168) (0.046) (0.341) (0.942) (0.405)
Much Above Average Income -0.621 1.159∗ -0.491 0.340 0.689
(0.407) (0.032) (0.556) (0.499) (0.131)
Much Below Average Income -1.738∗∗∗ -1.808∗∗∗ -2.215∗∗∗ -1.929∗∗∗ -2.775∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -1.347∗ 0.000327
(0.019) (1.000)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head -0.494 -0.437 -0.366 -0.0977 -0.306
(0.144) (0.139) (0.217) (0.703) (0.338)
Observations 1068 1070 1066 1068 1067
R2 0.384 0.361 0.301 0.319 0.368
Root MSE 2.035 1.924 2.020 2.009 1.917
District Council FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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themselves and their families. This makes marginal increase in household food
expenditure much more powerful in this quintile than the others, all else equal. The
coefficient implies that an increase of about $118 (U.S. 2008) per month in household
food spending would move a women up one level of SWB. For many people around the
world it would be difficult to even notice a $118 increase in monthly household food
spending. This value reflects the quality of life people in South Africa, and elsewhere,
struggle with. The R2’s of the models suggest the model best predicts SWB in the
bottom quintile and most poorly predicts SWB in the middle quintile. That said, the
R2’s are not demonstrably different across models.
6.2 EWB Primary Results
Table 12 displays the results of five regressions relating empowerment and EWB.
Models (1) and (2) use the EWB factor score as a dependent variable and the main
day-to-day spending decision-maker empowerment proxy and empowerment factor
score as measures of empowerment. Models (3) through (5) show results using
respondent’s happiness level as a measure of EWB. Models (3) and (4) use the
empowerment proxy as the primary independent variable, and model (5) uses the
empowerment factor score. The only primary independent variable that enters any of
the models with statistical significance is the empowerment factor score in model (2).
The sign on this coefficient is negative suggesting more empowered women have lower
levels of EWB. The p-value for this coefficient is less than 0.004. This provides strong
evidence that the coefficient is not equal to zero. The coefficient on the empowerment
factor score in model (2) can be interpreted using linear combinations of the Bartlett
scoring weights and standard deviations of the binary empowerment inputs. Table 13
displays a summary of these results. Table 14 displays the change to each women’s
EWB if they were move up one category in the EWB inputs. Table 13 shows, that
only the combined effect of moving from having no decision-making power in any
household areas to making decisions in all of recorded household areas begins to
approach any of the effects of any one category increase in the EWB inputs. The
combined effect is about −0.1071. The effect of moving up one more level in the
everything is an effort factor input is −0.1304. Unfortunately, due to the nature of
factor analysis there is no way to tell if the difference between these two values is an
inch or a mile. From a purely ordinal standpoint, because −0.1071 is less in absolute
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Table 12: EWB
OLS OLS OLS OLOGIT OLOGIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EWB Score EWB Score Happy Happy Happy
Empowerment Factor Score -0.0533∗∗ 0.0208
(0.004) (0.547)
Main decision-maker -0.0435 0.0112 0.0103
(0.196) (0.741) (0.872)
Age -0.0120∗ -0.00984 -0.00428 -0.00939 -0.0105
(0.016) (0.052) (0.379) (0.296) (0.245)
Age2 0.000139∗∗ 0.000121∗ 0.0000582 0.000131 0.000140
(0.006) (0.018) (0.225) (0.137) (0.113)
Household Income 0.0387 0.0352 0.0106 0.0303 0.0320
(10,000’s R) (0.060) (0.089) (0.648) (0.585) (0.565)
Household Food Expenditure 0.265 0.244 0.749∗∗ 1.725∗∗ 1.741∗∗
(10,000’s R) (0.287) (0.326) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.0868∗ -0.0854∗ 0.0122 0.00112 0.000438
(10,000’s R) (0.012) (0.013) (0.731) (0.989) (0.996)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.211∗ 0.178∗ 0.0924 0.188 0.203
(0.013) (0.039) (0.259) (0.222) (0.192)
Married 0.237∗∗ 0.197∗ 0.0634 0.155 0.173
(0.002) (0.012) (0.377) (0.254) (0.212)
Never Married 0.173∗ 0.165∗ 0.0479 0.132 0.135
(0.030) (0.039) (0.523) (0.351) (0.338)
Widow/Widower 0.0899 0.0898 0.0293 0.0639 0.0637
(0.273) (0.274) (0.702) (0.657) (0.658)
Above Average Income 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Average Income 0.0305 0.0308 0.0725 0.163 0.162
(0.599) (0.594) (0.254) (0.205) (0.207)
Below Average Income -0.116 -0.113 0.0397 0.109 0.107
(0.056) (0.062) (0.549) (0.411) (0.419)
Relative Income: Don’t Know -0.0115 -0.00370 -0.0217 -0.0267 -0.0313
(0.888) (0.964) (0.812) (0.881) (0.861)
Much Above Average Income -0.418∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.206 -0.404 -0.407
(0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.075) (0.073)
Much Below Average Income -0.456∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ 0.0821 0.200 0.198
(0.000) (0.000) (0.251) (0.159) (0.164)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -1.820 -1.817 0.387 0.757 0.753
(0.056) (0.052) (0.479) (0.519) (0.525)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head 0.0493 0.0314 0.00817 0.00299 0.0116
(0.395) (0.589) (0.898) (0.980) (0.922)
Observations 5339 5339 5339 5339 5339
R2 0.191 0.192 0.161
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069
Root MSE 0.986 0.985 0.984
District Council FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 13: Empowerment Score Inference
Std. Dev. Factor Weight Est. Effect
Day to Day Expenses 0.4958 0.0377 -0.0041
Large Unusual Purchase 0.5000 0.1089 -0.0116
Which School Children Attend 0.4926 0.0055 -0.0006
Who Lives in Household 0.4999 0.4185 -0.0446
Where Household Lives 0.4998 0.4335 -0.0462
Total -0.1071
Table 14: EWB Score: One Catagory Increase
Std. Dev. Factor Weight Est. Effect
Unusually Bothered 0.8323 0.1953 -0.2346
Trouble Focusing 0.8103 0.2650 -0.3270
Depressed 0.8973 0.2638 -0.2940
Everything an Effort 1.0027 0.1307 -0.1304
Fearful 0.8497 0.1708 -0.2011
Restless Sleep 0.9038 0.1587 -0.1755
Lonely 0.8410 0.1515 -0.1801
Can’t Get Going 0.8419 0.2014 -0.2392
value −0.1304, it is safe to say the model finds no practical relationship between the
empowerment factor score and the EWB factor score.
There are other elements of the models in Table 12 that can help judge their validity.
There is a quadratic statistically significant relationship between age and EWB score
in model (1). The relationship is also U shaped, like that of age and SWB. The age of
minimum EWB reported by the model is about 43 years of age. This is very similar to
the ages of minimum SWB from models (1) and (2) from Table 8, which showed a age
of minimum of 41 and 42, respectively. This suggests that age has a similar U-shaped
relationship with EWB as it does with SWB. This also suggests that at least model (1)
is showing the expected relationships between other variables and EWB. This suggest
the relationships shown between the empowerment proxy might also be legitimate.
The effect of age loses some of the statistical significance it displays in model (1) in
model (2) after the inclusion of the empowerment factor score instead of the
empowerment proxy. That being said, the p-value on the for the unsquared age
coefficient is still approximately 0.052. This provides weaker evidence of statistical
significance, but 0.052 is still a relatively small p-value. In any case, model (2) suggests
the age of minimum EWB is about 41. Once again, this is similar to the results of the
SWB models. Interestingly, food expenditure enters models (3) through (5)
significantly, and non-food expenditure enters models (1) and (2) significantly. This
could be due to the collinear nature of the income and spending variables. Also, this
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might suggest that the EWB proxy, stated happiness, and the EWB score aren’t
interchangeable. An important caveat I’ve mentioned several times is the negation of
the EWB score. This suggests that higher levels of EWB in this model are actually
lower levels of the original EWB score, which really measured sadness. In this case I
have assumed the absence of sadness is happiness. Due to the differences between
these results, this assumption, at least in this case, may be incorrect.
Table 15: Relative Income Inference
EWB Marginal Effects Much Above Much Below
Unusually Bothered -0.2346 1.7517 1.9222
Trouble Focusing -0.3270 1.2568 1.3791
Depressed -0.2940 1.3980 1.5341
Everything an Effort -0.1304 3.1522 3.4589
Fearful -0.2011 2.0440 2.2429
Restless Sleep -0.1755 2.3413 2.5692
Lonely -0.1801 2.2817 2.5038
Can’t Get Going -0.2392 1.7179 1.8851
Relative income has in interesting interaction with EWB score in models (1) and (3).
The marginal effects measured in model (2) of moving from the perceived relative
income category above average income to, much above average income or much below
average income are summarized in Table 15. The first column in Table 15 shows the
marginal effects in EWB factor score of increasing the level of a respondent in any of
the EWB input categories. The second and third columns of Table 15 show the
coefficients from model (2) divided by the marginal effect on the score from column 1.
This produces estimates of the number of levels a respondent would have to move up
in any one of categories in order to create an effect on their EWB score that is equal to
that of moving from the base case to either of the relative income categories displayed
in the table. The results of Table 15 suggest that moving from the relative income base
case to either of the categories displayed in the table equates to about a 3 category
increase in the everything is an effort category. This is essentially a women going from
saying they feel like everything is an effort, never, to everyday, the entire scale. In the
restless, unusually bothered, can’t get going and lonely categories, either of these two
changes in perceived relative income equates to about a 2 level change in category.
This equates to a women feeling these emotions never, to three to five days a week.
These results suggest relative income has a pronounced effect a women’s EWB. What
is truly interesting about these results is that the two categories are the polar extreme
perceived relative income categories. This would suggest that a women’s relative
income has a similar effect on her EWB if she believes she is very wealthy or if she
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believes she is very poor. The former result is unexpected given the results of
Kahneman and Deaton (2010), the latter is not. This could mean there is a problem
with the model, however, Kahneman and Deaton use data from the United States.
Maybe this quasi-inverted U shaped relationship is specific to developing countries or
the South African region. Perhaps the rich feel guilty, because they share a country
with individuals in total poverty. Helliwell (2006) might suggest the trappings of
wealth leaves these richer women unhappy. There is also the potential for women who
believe themselves richer to be concerned about theft or other crime. This
quasi-inverted U relationship could certainly be researched further.
At the model level, the models in Table 8 tended to be more explanatory than the
models in Table 12. The R2 values for models (1) through (3) are fairly low. Model (3)
only explains about 16.1% of the variation in EWB scores. Models (1) and (2) explain
about 19.1% and 19.2% of the variation in EWB scores, respectively. All of these
values are lower than the R2 values in the OLS regressions of SWB. Once again the
Pseudo R2 values are not as readily interpretable, however, the Pseudo R2 values for
models (4) and (5) are smaller than those in the OLOGIT models in Table 8. This
suggests that these models are poorer predictors of happiness category than the
OLOGIT models in Table 8 were of SWB.
In order to test robustness of the results of model (2), I perform a similar incremental
addition of covariates as I did with SWB. The results of this procedure are displayed in
Table 16. In this case, there are more pronounced changes in the coefficient on the
empowerment factor score than the changes seen during the similar procedure in Table
10. While the coefficient stays statistically significant through all models, it changes by
about 61%. This suggest that the covariates added to the model are correlated with
both EWB and the empowerment factor score. The most noticeable changes occurs
after the inclusion of personal characteristics in model (2). This reduces the magnitude
of the effect the empowerment factor score has on EWB by about 50%. This effect
continues to decrease, but at a slower rate, as additional covariates are added. It is
intuitive that the inclusion of personal characteristics would reduce the effect the
empowerment factor score has on EWB. Personal characteristics are most likely a
determinant of both empowerment and EWB. The R2 of the model increase from 0.016
in the uncontrolled model to 0.192 in the fully controlled model. Even in the full
model, 80.8% of the variation in EWB is not accounted for. Unlike the results in Table
10, the coefficient is not stable and there is still quite a bit of unaccounted for
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Table 16: EWB: Empowerment Scores
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EWB EWB EWB EWB
Empowerment Factor Score -0.138∗∗∗ -0.0695∗∗∗ -0.0568∗∗ -0.0533∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004)
Age -0.0123∗ -0.0110∗ -0.00984
(0.016) (0.031) (0.052)
Age2 0.000168∗∗ 0.000143∗∗ 0.000121∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.018)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.193∗ 0.207∗ 0.178∗
(0.030) (0.018) (0.039)
Married 0.249∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.197∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.012)
Never Married 0.177∗ 0.189∗ 0.165∗
(0.033) (0.020) (0.039)
Widow/Widower 0.107 0.115 0.0898
(0.208) (0.167) (0.274)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head 0.0338 0.0271 0.0314
(0.565) (0.641) (0.589)
Household Income 0.0224 0.0352
(10,000’s R) (0.278) (0.089)
Household Food Expenditure 0.328 0.244
(10,000’s R) (0.183) (0.326)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.0883∗∗ -0.0854∗
(10,000’s R) (0.010) (0.013)
Above Average Income 0 0
(.) (.)
Average Income 0.0446 0.0308
(0.433) (0.594)
Below Average Income -0.110 -0.113
(0.066) (0.062)
Relative Income: Don’t Know -0.0387 -0.00370
(0.634) (0.964)
Much Above Average Income -0.355∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.000)
Much Below Average Income -0.450∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -1.931 -1.817
(0.076) (0.052)
Observations 5339 5339 5339 5339
R2 0.016 0.127 0.153 0.192
Root MSE 1.075 1.019 1.004 0.985
Personal Charcs. No Yes Yes Yes
Household Charcs. No No Yes Yes
Geo. FE No No No Yes
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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variation. These results suggest there is likely an endogeneity problem in this model.
Although there is no way to know for sure, it is unlikely of the remaining 80.8% of
variation in EWB is not at all related to the empowerment factor score. This suggests
a more complex identification strategy might be appropriate.
Similar to the procedure performed with the SWB regressions, I have chosen to break
the data used in model (2) from Table 12 down by income quintiles. Model (2) is the
obvious choice because it is the only model with a statistically significant result for a
primary independent variable. Statistical significance diminishes on almost all
covariates after the data are broken down by income quintile. The empowerment
factor score enters models (2) and (5) with statistical significance. Tables 18 and 19
summarize the effect of a change in any of the empowerment inputs on EWB in the
same way Tables 13 and 14. These tables show, in the 2nd income quintile a women
who is the main decision-maker in all of the measured areas of the household will have
lower EWB than a women who is not the main decision-maker in any of the areas of
her household. This reduction in EWB is at least greater than a one category increase
the prevalence of fear, loneliness, restless sleep or feeling like everything is an effort.
The tables also show that, in the 5th quintile, a women who is the main decision-maker
in her home in all realms will have a lower EWB than a women who is not. This
difference in EWB is greater than the reduction in EWB associated with a one
category increase in the feeling that everything is an effort. Some of the relative
income covariates remain significant in models (3) through (5). This suggests, at least
as far as EWB is concerned, relative income is less important for women of relatively
lower incomes. These results are more practically significant than the results found
when the the data were not broken down by income quintile. All of the models account
for a similar amount of variation in EWB. Model (5) accounts for the most variation,
approximately 31.1%, and model (1) accounts for the least, 24.3%. I address the broad
conclusions that may be drawn from all of these results in the Section 8.
7 Sensitivity Testing
7.1 SWB Sensitivity Testing
In order to test the sensitivity of the the results in Section 6, I investigate the
differences in effects after using different subsets of data using model (1) for SWB in
from Table 8 and model (2) for EWB in Table 12. The three different subsets I use to
55
Table 17: EWB By Income Quintiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quint 1 Quint 2 Quint 3 Quint 4 Quint 5
Empowerment Factor Score 0.00534 -0.114∗ -0.0377 -0.0248 -0.0776∗
(0.906) (0.013) (0.416) (0.577) (0.048)
Age -0.00691 -0.0120 -0.0124 -0.00605 0.00888
(0.577) (0.275) (0.223) (0.615) (0.498)
Age2 0.0000605 0.000176 0.000127 0.000114 -0.0000571
(0.646) (0.102) (0.207) (0.347) (0.661)
Household Income 0.0649 1.133 0.372 -0.111 0.0362
(10,000’s R) (0.959) (0.492) (0.764) (0.804) (0.076)
Household Food Expenditure 0.260 0.330 0.225 0.945 -0.193
(10,000’s R) (0.814) (0.793) (0.803) (0.164) (0.576)
Household Non-Food Expenditure 0.120 0.0822 -0.352 0.0737 -0.0769∗
(10,000’s R) (0.674) (0.673) (0.292) (0.475) (0.042)
Living with Partner 0.220 -0.231 0.178 -0.162 -0.136
(0.260) (0.244) (0.331) (0.433) (0.436)
Married 0.200 0.133 0.0500 0.122 -0.152
(0.191) (0.341) (0.714) (0.402) (0.419)
Widow 0.0393 0.0846 0.0418 0.238 0.0991
(0.749) (0.461) (0.742) (0.068) (0.443)
Never Married 0.142 0.0912 0.165 0.140 0.144
(0.257) (0.453) (0.181) (0.236) (0.197)
Above Average Income -0.0565 0.212 0.102 0.865∗∗∗ 0.533∗
(0.874) (0.547) (0.738) (0.001) (0.011)
Average Income 0.0743 0.624 0.221 0.751∗∗ 0.441∗
(0.792) (0.050) (0.447) (0.002) (0.026)
Below Average Income 0.00611 0.480 0.141 0.496∗ 0.201
(0.983) (0.129) (0.627) (0.039) (0.338)
Much Below Average Income -0.535 0.142 -0.169 0.462 -0.226
(0.059) (0.657) (0.570) (0.069) (0.375)
Not Applicable 0 0 -3.373∗∗∗ 0 0.0847
(.) (.) (0.000) (.) (0.835)
Don’t Know -0.281 0.664 0.584 0.646∗ 0.533∗
(0.361) (0.063) (0.067) (0.018) (0.028)
Much Above Average Income 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Observations 1068 1070 1066 1068 1067
R2 0.243 0.267 0.256 0.267 0.311
Root MSE 1.040 0.989 1.003 0.972 0.866
District Council FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 18: Empowerment Score Inference: Relative Income
Std. Dev. Factor Weight Est. Effect Q2 Est. Effect Q5
Day to Day Expenses 0.4958 0.0377 -0.0087 -0.0059
Large Unusual Purchase 0.5000 0.1089 -0.0248 -0.0169
Which School Children Attend 0.4926 0.0055 -0.0013 -0.0009
Who Lives in Household 0.4999 0.4185 -0.0954 -0.0650
Where Household Lives 0.4998 0.4335 -0.0989 -0.0673
Total -0.2291 -0.1559
Table 19: EWB Score: One Catagory Increase
Std. Dev. Factor Weight Est. Effect
Unusually Bothered 0.8323 0.1953 -0.2346
Trouble Focusing 0.8103 0.2650 -0.3270
Depressed 0.8973 0.2638 -0.2940
Everything an Effort 1.0027 0.1307 -0.1304
Fearful 0.8497 0.1708 -0.2011
Restless Sleep 0.9038 0.1587 -0.1755
Lonely 0.8410 0.1515 -0.1801
Can’t Get Going 0.8419 0.2014 -0.2392
investigate sensitivity are all adults, married women and women who are the spouse of
the head of their household.
Model (1) in Table 20 displays the results of using an almost identical regression to
that of model (1) in Table 8 with all adults. The only difference is an added gender
dummy and interaction term between the gender dummy and the empowerment proxy.
The effect of begin the main decision-maker in the household is no longer statistically
significant, however, the interaction term is significant. The interaction term suggests
that women who are the main decision-makers in their households have lower levels of
SWB than women who are not the main decision-makers in their households. The
effect in this regression is slightly more pronounced. The coefficient on the
gender-main decision-maker interaction term is about 0.061 units more negative than
the corresponding coefficient in model (1) of Table 8. Model (1) also shows similar
results in terms of the relationship between age and SWB. This model shows a
U-shaped relationship with a minimum at about 43 years. Household food
expenditures are again statistically and practically significant, as they were in the
primary SWB model. The relationships between different levels of relative income and
SWB are almost identical between the primary SWB regression and model (1) in this
table. The similarity between these results suggests that the primary regression for
SWB is robust to changes in data inputs.
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Table 20: Sensitivity Testing: SWB
(1) (2) (3)
All Adults Married Women Female Spouses
Main decision-maker 0.122 -0.145 -0.0480
(0.130) (0.119) (0.928)
Female 0.132
(0.093)
Female X Main -0.234∗
(0.017)
Age -0.0308∗∗∗ -0.00431 -0.120∗
(0.000) (0.832) (0.026)
Age2 0.000359∗∗∗ 0.000134 0.00124
(0.000) (0.500) (0.054)
Household Income 0.0487 0.0115 0.597
(0.138) (0.815) (0.057)
Household Food Expenditure 1.299∗∗∗ 0.986 4.736
(0.001) (0.117) (0.154)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.0187 0.0367 -0.774
(0.726) (0.632) (0.090)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.00174 1.944
(0.991) (0.225)
Married 0.184 3.094∗
(0.166) (0.040)
Never Married 0.0312 2.452
(0.822) (0.111)
Widow/Widower 0.112 2.816
(0.436) (0.082)
Above Average Income 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Average Income -0.488∗∗∗ -0.344∗ -1.256
(0.000) (0.032) (0.376)
Below Average Income -1.573∗∗∗ -1.461∗∗∗ -2.317
(0.000) (0.000) (0.111)
Relative Income: Don’t Know 0.000260 0.0963 0.0453
(0.999) (0.779) (0.977)
Much Above Average Income 0.615∗∗ 0.496 -0.974
(0.003) (0.175) (0.636)
Much Below Average Income -2.187∗∗∗ -2.214∗∗∗ -2.600
(0.000) (0.000) (0.083)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -0.229
(0.766)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head -0.110 0.0359
(0.293) (0.910)
Observations 8655 1895 322
R2 0.300 0.361 0.568
Root MSE 2.046 1.923 2.031
District Council FE Yes Yes Yes
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Models (2) and (3) show fewer statistically significant variables. Part of this is due to a
much lower sample size. Married women do show the expected relationship with
respect to relative income and SWB, but the regression is otherwise inconclusive.
Model (3) has a much lower sample size. The lack of significance on the empowerment
proxy is likely due to insufficient variation in the empowerment proxy due the sample
size. That said, the model’s inability to produce similar results in these subsets of
women is concerning. If the relationship between empowerment and SWB is strong
and robust, than it ought to appear in these samples. There is the possibility that
either theses subsets of the women were inadvertently sampled in a way that
introduced some kind of bias. This would be one explanation for the different results.
Given the quality of the data collection process, I find this unlikely. The overall result
from the specificity testing in the table is inconclusive. Model (1) seems to support the
robustness of the original SWB model, while models (2) and (3) suggest there is a
specification problem with the original model.
7.2 EWB Sensitivity Testing
Table 21 performs the same specificity testing displayed in Table 20. Neither the
empowerment factor score nor the gender interaction term are statistically significant
in model (1). The coefficient on the female dummy variable is significant, and has a
relatively large value. This is concerning. If the primary model of EWB is correct, the
gender-empowerment interaction term ought to be significant in this regression. The
fact that it is not and the female dummy is suggests the EWB regression might be
picking up some trend among women that is unrelated to empowerment. This problem
is reinforced by the similar nature of the other results displayed in model 1. This model
also shows a U-shaped relationship between age and EWB with a minimum of about
43. Household non-food expenditures are also significant, just as they were in the
primary EWB model. Some of the marital status dummies enter significantly, which
was also true in the primary EWB model. The relationship between EWB and relative
income in this model is almost identical to that of the primary EWB model. The same
coefficients are significant, and their values are within two hundredths of each other.
Models (2) and (3) also suffer from the smaller sample sizes displayed in Table 20.
Model (2) does show a significant relationship between empowerment factor score and
EWB. However, given the results of model (1) this results is suspect. It is also
interesting, and perhaps coincidental, that the empowerment score coefficient in model
59
Table 21: Sensitivity Tests: EWB
(1) (2) (3)
All Adults Married Women Female Spouses
Empowerment Factor Score -0.0260 -0.150∗∗ -0.105
(0.212) (0.006) (0.156)
Female -0.158∗∗∗
(0.000)
Female X Empowerment Score -0.0296
(0.246)
Age -0.0130∗∗ 0.0168 -0.00132
(0.001) (0.111) (0.957)
Age2 0.000151∗∗∗ -0.000132 -0.00000977
(0.000) (0.210) (0.973)
Household Income 0.0385∗ 0.0305 -0.117
(0.015) (0.191) (0.537)
Household Food Expenditure 0.234 0.238 -1.564
(0.199) (0.474) (0.257)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.0908∗∗ -0.0665 0.0646
(0.001) (0.113) (0.696)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.269∗∗∗ 1.177
(0.000) (0.072)
Married 0.270∗∗∗ 0.483
(0.000) (0.433)
Never Married 0.236∗∗ 0.536
(0.001) (0.391)
Widow/Widower 0.152∗ 0.615
(0.042) (0.344)
Above Average Income 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Average Income 0.0618 0.0629 0.274
(0.155) (0.472) (0.494)
Below Average Income -0.0583 -0.178 -0.190
(0.206) (0.068) (0.625)
Relative Income: Don’t Know 0.0171 0.166 0.0452
(0.789) (0.274) (0.924)
Much Above Average Income -0.420∗∗∗ -0.522∗∗ -1.680∗∗
(0.000) (0.005) (0.002)
Much Below Average Income -0.431∗∗∗ -0.505∗∗∗ -0.108
(0.000) (0.000) (0.790)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -1.832
(0.066)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head 0.0219 -0.00356
(0.637) (0.979)
Observations 8655 1895 322
R2 0.182 0.243 0.519
Root MSE 0.991 0.977 0.944
District Council FE Yes Yes Yes
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(2) differs from the coefficient in model (1) by only about eight thousandths. This
could be a case of apples and oranges, or it could be another sign of misspecification in
the EWB model. Only the coefficient on much above average income enters the model
(3) significantly. This is unsurprising given the small sample size. Unfortunately, the
specificity tests displayed in Table 21 present evidence of misspecification in the
primary EWB model.
8 Conclusion
The relationship between empowerment and well-being is undeniably important. The
effect increasing women’s agency in their homes and their communities has on their
well-being can help further inform policy makers about the implications of many
development policies. Although the empirical results of the primary model between
SWB and empowerment did appear to be relatively robust, the direction was negative.
This is not the relationship I initially expected to measure, however, This doesn’t
mean this couldn’t be the actual relationship. The results of the EWB model are
partially suspect given the results of the specificity testing on this model. One solution
to some of the identification problems would be expanding the scope of the data to
include the NIDS Wave 2 data. This would allow for individual-level fixed effects on
women in the data set. Individual fixed effects ought to control for most of the
unobservable variation between women that effects both empowerment and SWB and
EWB. Using fixed effects would definitely bring more validity to both regressions,
however, during preliminary experiments the use of fixed effects did not change the
direction of the relationship between well-being and empowerment. The direction of
this relationship could actually make sense in context.
The goal of this research was to obtain the pure empowerment effect on well-being.
Empowerment brings more access to real and abstract goods. This access will likely
lead to greater measures of well-being. My models intentionally try to mitigate the
effect of consumption in order to find a pure empowerment effect. The pure
empowerment effect boils down to whether or not making decisions makes a person
happier independent of the increased access to resources their level of empowerment
brings them. Making decisions is difficult, especially if you are faced with the series of
less than optimal choices available to many people living in the developing world.
There is also the possibility that women who are the main decision-makers in their
households became the main decision-makers not by choice. Some women could be
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forced into a role of authority after the head of household leaves, dies or becomes
disabled. The new power may have some perks for this woman, but there would almost
certainly be an increase in stress. Changes in welfare depend on the circumstances
under which a women gained empowerment. This is similar to the theories and
findings of Goldin (2006) concerning women joining the workforce. Another way to
more effectively measure the relationship between empowerment and SWB and EWB
would be measure a change in welfare after an exogenous change in empowerment.
One such example would be measuring women’s welfare after a country grants women
suffrage. Another identification strategy could be formed by studying differences
between married and divorced women.
Understanding how decision-making affects women in the developing world as women
gain positions of authority could lead to a better ways of improving the status of
women around the world. Decision-making is difficult. This research offers another
example of the complexities of freedom, choice and happiness. Anecdotally, a person
who is free to make their own choices should be happier than a person who is not.
This research suggests that this relationship is not as simple as it may seem. In the
context of economic development, further research in this field may allow for new ways
of increasing empowerment and well-being for women around the world.
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A Appendix
A.1 SWB Full Regression Tables
Table 22: SWB Full Regressions
OLS OLS OLOGIT OLOGIT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SWB SWB SWB SWB
Empowerment Factor Score -0.0593 -0.0462
(0.115) (0.162)
Main decision-maker -0.174∗ -0.147∗
(0.010) (0.013)
Age -0.0308∗∗ -0.0329∗∗ -0.0285∗∗ -0.0304∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Age2 0.000372∗∗∗ 0.000390∗∗∗ 0.000348∗∗∗ 0.000365∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Household Income 0.0327 0.0312 -0.000875 -0.00202
(10,000’s R) (0.448) (0.470) (0.981) (0.957)
Household Food Expenditure 1.252∗ 1.305∗ 1.131∗∗ 1.176∗∗
(10,000’s R) (0.014) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.0560 -0.0586 -0.00879 -0.0108
(10,000’s R) (0.416) (0.394) (0.869) (0.840)
Asian 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Asian/Indian 1.218∗∗∗ 1.220∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗ 1.257∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Coloured 1.021∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White 0.922∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployed 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Employed 0.149∗ 0.142 0.133∗ 0.126∗
(0.042) (0.053) (0.032) (0.042)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.00544 0.00926 -0.0230 -0.0157
(0.976) (0.959) (0.881) (0.919)
Married 0.244 0.245 0.209 0.215
(0.123) (0.129) (0.121) (0.117)
Never Married 0.0672 0.0701 0.0639 0.0678
(0.684) (0.671) (0.653) (0.633)
Widow/Widower 0.155 0.152 0.116 0.113
(0.352) (0.362) (0.416) (0.428)
Owns Radio 0.155∗ 0.151∗ 0.120∗ 0.117∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.032) (0.038)
Owns Stereo 0.213∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.199∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004)
Owns Sewing Machine 0.0786 0.0798 0.0706 0.0727
(0.505) (0.499) (0.492) (0.479)
Owns Car 0.0531 0.0561 0.0841 0.0879
(0.700) (0.684) (0.478) (0.459)
Owns Bicycle 0.265 0.262 0.254 0.250
(0.214) (0.219) (0.159) (0.165)
Owns Computer -0.210 -0.206 -0.231 -0.225
(0.185) (0.194) (0.094) (0.102)
Owns Camera 0.293 0.298 0.255 0.258
(0.063) (0.058) (0.063) (0.059)
Owns Cell Phone 0.0211 0.0149 0.0457 0.0402
(0.749) (0.821) (0.427) (0.484)
Don’t Know Father’s Ed 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Father’s Ed: Grade 1 0.106 0.118 0.172 0.177
(0.762) (0.736) (0.589) (0.576)
Father’s Ed: Grade 10 -0.0640 -0.0608 -0.0760 -0.0705
(0.704) (0.718) (0.597) (0.623)
Father’s Ed: Grade 11 0.964∗ 0.953∗ 0.766∗ 0.753
(0.018) (0.019) (0.049) (0.052)
Father’s Ed: Grade 12 0.141 0.146 0.113 0.119
(0.401) (0.385) (0.430) (0.404)
Father’s Ed: Grade 2 0.539 0.535 0.389 0.391
(0.073) (0.073) (0.126) (0.123)
Father’s Ed: Grade 3 -0.107 -0.111 -0.0619 -0.0650
(0.606) (0.591) (0.751) (0.739)
Father’s Ed: Grade 4 0.209 0.206 0.130 0.129
(0.393) (0.398) (0.565) (0.568)
Father’s Ed: Grade 5 -0.0352 -0.0338 -0.00434 0.00182
(0.869) (0.874) (0.981) (0.992)
Father’s Ed: Grade 6 0.253 0.247 0.215 0.211
(0.234) (0.245) (0.223) (0.231)
Father’s Ed: Grade 7 -0.268 -0.261 -0.263 -0.257
(0.136) (0.146) (0.080) (0.088)
Father’s Ed: Grade 8 0.152 0.153 0.139 0.140
(0.354) (0.355) (0.328) (0.326)
Father’s Ed: Grade 9 -0.0202 -0.00974 0.0516 0.0588
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(0.930) (0.967) (0.799) (0.772)
Father’s Ed: Grade R//O -0.498 -0.475 -0.416 -0.406
(0.467) (0.492) (0.439) (0.451)
Father’s Ed: No Schooling -0.0381 -0.0359 -0.0357 -0.0329
(0.725) (0.741) (0.703) (0.726)
Father’s Ed: Refused 0.505 0.377 -0.0268 -0.142
(0.327) (0.460) (0.950) (0.735)
Mothers Ed: Cert w < Grade 12 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Mothers Ed: Don’t Know -0.334 -0.338 -0.594∗ -0.600∗
(0.265) (0.261) (0.016) (0.015)
Mothers Ed: Grade 1 -0.689 -0.704 -0.941∗ -0.957∗
(0.184) (0.174) (0.040) (0.035)
Mothers Ed: Grade 10 -0.310 -0.326 -0.525∗ -0.542∗
(0.313) (0.288) (0.039) (0.033)
Mothers Ed: Grade 11 -0.286 -0.293 -0.609 -0.618
(0.527) (0.517) (0.153) (0.147)
Mothers Ed: Grade 12 -0.351 -0.363 -0.535∗ -0.552∗
(0.274) (0.258) (0.045) (0.039)
Mothers Ed: Grade 2 -0.363 -0.359 -0.547 -0.550
(0.282) (0.287) (0.053) (0.051)
Mothers Ed: Grade 3 -0.218 -0.224 -0.449 -0.460
(0.514) (0.502) (0.113) (0.104)
Mothers Ed: Grade 4 -0.129 -0.136 -0.368 -0.379
(0.692) (0.675) (0.177) (0.164)
Mothers Ed: Grade 5 -0.208 -0.214 -0.465 -0.475
(0.520) (0.508) (0.083) (0.077)
Mothers Ed: Grade 6 -0.250 -0.263 -0.553∗ -0.569∗
(0.438) (0.416) (0.042) (0.036)
Mothers Ed: Grade 7 -0.136 -0.149 -0.351 -0.365
(0.667) (0.638) (0.185) (0.168)
Mothers Ed: Grade 8 -0.650∗ -0.657∗ -0.806∗∗ -0.817∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.027) (0.001) (0.001)
Mothers Ed: Grade 9 -0.0923 -0.0991 -0.346 -0.358
(0.807) (0.793) (0.304) (0.288)
Mothers Ed: Grade R//O 0.266 0.241 0.0715 0.0565
(0.794) (0.815) (0.953) (0.963)
Mothers Ed: No Schooling -0.494 -0.500 -0.695∗∗ -0.705∗∗
(0.089) (0.086) (0.004) (0.003)
Mothers Ed: Refused 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
No Driver’s License 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Driver’s License: Refused -0.987 -0.973 -0.822 -0.811
(0.118) (0.118) (0.271) (0.272)
Has Driver’s License -0.0863 -0.0894 -0.0550 -0.0596
(0.523) (0.509) (0.635) (0.608)
Perceived Health: Don’t Know 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Perceived Health: Excellent -0.340 -0.361 -0.455 -0.473
(0.507) (0.484) (0.333) (0.317)
Perceived Health: Fair -0.565 -0.589 -0.633 -0.653
(0.270) (0.254) (0.177) (0.166)
Perceived Health: Good -0.522 -0.545 -0.558 -0.577
(0.306) (0.288) (0.232) (0.220)
Perceived Health: Poor -0.905 -0.931 -0.953∗ -0.975∗
(0.078) (0.072) (0.042) (0.039)
Perceived Health: Very Good -0.367 -0.389 -0.449 -0.468
(0.474) (0.451) (0.338) (0.322)
Alfred Nzo(DC44) 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Amajuba(DC25) 1.360∗∗∗ 1.339∗∗∗ 1.505∗∗∗ 1.486∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Amathole(DC12) -0.507 -0.518 -0.503 -0.510
(0.264) (0.256) (0.359) (0.357)
Bojanala(DC37) 1.058∗∗ 1.064∗∗ 1.027∗∗ 1.030∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Buffalo City(BUF) -0.377 -0.381 -0.198 -0.201
(0.429) (0.423) (0.702) (0.697)
Cacadu(DC10) -0.251 -0.259 -0.0368 -0.0415
(0.471) (0.456) (0.907) (0.895)
Cape Winelands(DC2) 0.549 0.540 0.588∗ 0.578∗
(0.057) (0.061) (0.023) (0.025)
Capricorn(DC35) -0.544 -0.537 -0.710 -0.703
(0.171) (0.178) (0.084) (0.088)
Central Karoo(DC5) 1.404∗∗∗ 1.389∗∗∗ 1.322∗∗∗ 1.312∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Chris Hani(DC13) 0.0705 0.0647 0.203 0.201
(0.796) (0.813) (0.426) (0.429)
City of Cape Town(CPT) 0.394 0.397 0.456 0.459
(0.192) (0.189) (0.097) (0.094)
City of Johannesburg(JHB) 0.703∗ 0.705∗ 0.737∗∗ 0.740∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006)
City of Tshwane(TSH) 1.031∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 1.048∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dr Kenneth Kaunda(DC40) 0.653 0.667 0.620 0.631
(0.070) (0.064) (0.072) (0.066)
Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati(DC39) 0.643∗ 0.653∗ 0.674∗ 0.687∗
(0.045) (0.042) (0.016) (0.014)
Eden(DC4) 0.805∗ 0.804∗ 0.831∗∗ 0.829∗∗
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(0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005)
Ehlanzeni(DC32) 1.580∗∗∗ 1.589∗∗∗ 1.547∗∗∗ 1.557∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ekurhuleni(EKU) 0.480 0.485 0.612∗ 0.620∗
(0.123) (0.119) (0.025) (0.023)
Fezile Dabi(DC20) 1.005∗ 1.007∗ 0.936∗∗ 0.945∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006)
Frances Baard(DC9) 0.220 0.220 0.443 0.444
(0.540) (0.542) (0.162) (0.159)
Gert Sibande(DC30) 1.200∗∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Greater Sekhukhune(DC47) 0.684∗ 0.692∗ 0.823∗∗ 0.830∗∗
(0.035) (0.033) (0.005) (0.005)
Joe Gqabi(DC14) 0.270 0.269 0.361 0.361
(0.321) (0.323) (0.140) (0.139)
John Taolo Gaetsewe(DC45) 1.173∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.159∗∗∗ 1.158∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Lejweleputswa(DC18) 0.889∗ 0.892∗ 0.750∗ 0.752∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.019)
Mangaung(MAN) 0.497 0.503 0.630 0.633
(0.272) (0.266) (0.131) (0.129)
Mopani(DC33) -0.494 -0.488 -0.302 -0.297
(0.132) (0.135) (0.316) (0.323)
Namakwa(DC6) 1.353∗∗∗ 1.356∗∗∗ 1.381∗∗∗ 1.379∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nelson Mandela Bay(NMA) 0.583∗ 0.570 0.732∗∗ 0.724∗∗
(0.047) (0.052) (0.006) (0.007)
Ngaka Modiri Molema(DC38) 0.0831 0.0925 0.101 0.109
(0.779) (0.754) (0.695) (0.673)
Nkangala(DC31) 0.620∗ 0.619∗ 0.599∗ 0.600∗
(0.036) (0.037) (0.024) (0.023)
O.R.Tambo(DC15) 1.053∗∗∗ 1.055∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗∗ 1.055∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Overberg(DC3) 1.108∗∗∗ 1.097∗∗∗ 1.048∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pixley ka Seme(DC7) 1.561∗∗∗ 1.567∗∗∗ 1.509∗∗∗ 1.515∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sedibeng(DC42) 0.588 0.586 0.603∗ 0.603∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.029) (0.029)
Sisonke(DC43) 0.324 0.328 0.428 0.433
(0.208) (0.202) (0.068) (0.064)
Siyanda(DC8) 0.0369 0.0468 0.179 0.188
(0.919) (0.897) (0.569) (0.548)
Thabo Mofutsanyane(DC19) 1.183∗∗∗ 1.183∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UMgungundlovu(DC22) -0.118 -0.124 -0.0924 -0.0931
(0.702) (0.687) (0.740) (0.738)
Ugu(DC21) 0.0702 0.0753 0.182 0.187
(0.787) (0.772) (0.439) (0.425)
Umkhanyakude(DC27) -0.217 -0.211 -0.0980 -0.0926
(0.460) (0.471) (0.712) (0.727)
Umzinyathi(DC24) -0.204 -0.198 -0.0140 -0.00710
(0.475) (0.490) (0.958) (0.979)
Uthukela(DC23) -0.0762 -0.0671 0.0509 0.0609
(0.780) (0.805) (0.839) (0.808)
Uthungulu(DC28) 0.219 0.205 0.352 0.340
(0.460) (0.487) (0.197) (0.211)
Vhembe(DC34) 0.424 0.419 0.332 0.330
(0.346) (0.351) (0.383) (0.384)
Waterberg(DC36) -0.306 -0.305 -0.153 -0.151
(0.336) (0.337) (0.609) (0.614)
West Coast(DC1) 0.836∗ 0.827∗ 0.813∗∗ 0.807∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
West Rand(DC48) 0.487 0.497 0.655 0.664
(0.225) (0.215) (0.076) (0.071)
Xhariep(DC16) 0.939∗∗ 0.942∗∗ 0.939∗∗ 0.943∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Zululand(DC26) -0.0284 -0.0227 0.0285 0.0343
(0.919) (0.935) (0.909) (0.891)
eThekwini(ETH) 0.0590 0.0575 0.0545 0.0565
(0.853) (0.856) (0.854) (0.849)
iLembe(DC29) -0.197 -0.200 -0.174 -0.170
(0.533) (0.528) (0.567) (0.576)
Above Average Income 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Average Income -0.476∗∗∗ -0.479∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Below Average Income -1.555∗∗∗ -1.559∗∗∗ -1.492∗∗∗ -1.493∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Don’t Know 0.216 0.209 0.250 0.245
(0.299) (0.316) (0.198) (0.209)
Much Above Average Income 0.253 0.251 0.266 0.264
(0.336) (0.340) (0.240) (0.242)
Much Below Average Income -2.240∗∗∗ -2.244∗∗∗ -2.163∗∗∗ -2.166∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -0.187 -0.198 -0.201 -0.208
(0.733) (0.722) (0.644) (0.641)
Drinks Alcohol: 1-2 Days A Week 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Drinks Alcohol: 3-4 Days A Week -0.720∗ -0.708∗ -0.683∗∗ -0.674∗
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(0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011)
Drinks Alcohol: 5-6 Days a Week -0.492 -0.502 -0.473 -0.478
(0.310) (0.297) (0.286) (0.279)
Drinks Alcohol: < 1 Days a Week -0.345 -0.352 -0.261 -0.270
(0.245) (0.238) (0.308) (0.293)
Drinks Alcohol: Very Rarely -0.121 -0.122 -0.130 -0.130
(0.532) (0.528) (0.430) (0.428)
Drinks Alcohol: Everyday -0.101 -0.0930 -0.181 -0.168
(0.785) (0.801) (0.584) (0.611)
Drinks Alcohol: Never Has -0.128 -0.126 -0.125 -0.124
(0.466) (0.471) (0.393) (0.399)
Drinks Alcohol: No Longer Drinks 0.0294 0.0244 0.0122 0.00834
(0.876) (0.897) (0.939) (0.959)
Smoking: Doesn’t Know 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Smoking: No 1.778∗ 1.759∗ 1.087∗ 1.075∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.042) (0.045)
Smoking: Not Applicable 0.365 0.341 -0.109 -0.126
(0.681) (0.700) (0.850) (0.826)
Smoking: Yes 1.419 1.397 0.819 0.804
(0.098) (0.103) (0.128) (0.136)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head -0.284∗ -0.265∗ -0.258∗ -0.241∗
(0.033) (0.048) (0.026) (0.038)
Constant 5.202∗∗∗ 5.210∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
cut1
Constant -3.974∗∗∗ -3.978∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
cut2
Constant -3.269∗∗∗ -3.273∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
cut3
Constant -2.372∗∗ -2.377∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
cut4
Constant -1.400 -1.406
(0.084) (0.085)
cut5
Constant -0.336 -0.342
(0.678) (0.675)
cut6
Constant 0.373 0.367
(0.645) (0.652)
cut7
Constant 1.127 1.121
(0.164) (0.168)
cut8
Constant 1.980∗ 1.972∗
(0.014) (0.015)
cut9
Constant 2.406∗∗ 2.398∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 5339 5339 5339 5339
R2 0.324 0.324
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.095
Root MSE 2.016 2.017
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
A.2 SWB Full Regression Tables By Income Quintiles
Table 23: SWB Full Regressions By Income Quintiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quint 1 Quint 2 Quint 3 Quint 4 Quint 5
Main decision-maker -0.104 0.145 -0.185 -0.127 -0.167
(0.556) (0.395) (0.257) (0.402) (0.235)
Age -0.0163 -0.0331 -0.0409 -0.0628∗ -0.0221
(0.508) (0.114) (0.078) (0.012) (0.478)
Age2 0.000226 0.000336 0.000347 0.000649∗∗ 0.000426
(0.370) (0.091) (0.110) (0.010) (0.191)
Household Income 2.935 2.571 3.407 1.040 0.0907
(10,000’s R) (0.249) (0.420) (0.155) (0.253) (0.066)
Household Food Expenditure 10.43∗∗∗ 1.955 1.315 1.825 -0.727
(10,000’s R) (0.000) (0.387) (0.458) (0.154) (0.276)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.417 0.0111 0.381 0.165 -0.0472
(10,000’s R) (0.449) (0.984) (0.553) (0.474) (0.505)
Asian 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Asian/Indian -0.510 1.786∗∗ 1.491∗ 0.978 1.134∗
(0.527) (0.002) (0.025) (0.136) (0.010)
Coloured 0.393 0.826∗ 0.952∗ 0.692∗ 1.278∗∗∗
(0.384) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.000)
White 0.185 -0.181 1.005 0.541 0.903∗∗
(0.896) (0.806) (0.213) (0.251) (0.001)
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0
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(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Employed 0.212 -0.171 0.318 -0.0380 0.155
(0.423) (0.370) (0.085) (0.817) (0.266)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.426 0.866∗ -0.944∗ -0.492 0.431
(0.272) (0.021) (0.017) (0.250) (0.321)
Married 0.488 0.851∗ -0.262 0.107 0.172
(0.167) (0.017) (0.481) (0.768) (0.584)
Never Married 0.401 0.640 -0.387 -0.200 0.349
(0.253) (0.063) (0.317) (0.613) (0.334)
Widow/Widower 0.425 0.710∗ -0.195 0.257 -0.300
(0.240) (0.044) (0.616) (0.523) (0.402)
Owns Radio 0.179 0.265 0.146 0.438∗∗ 0.107
(0.253) (0.054) (0.327) (0.005) (0.474)
Owns Stereo 0.490∗ 0.358 0.0436 -0.121 0.283
(0.029) (0.096) (0.826) (0.482) (0.077)
Owns Sewing Machine -0.207 -0.556 -0.231 0.422 0.0342
(0.721) (0.199) (0.470) (0.137) (0.837)
Owns Car 0.0814 0.754 0.460 0.346 -0.240
(0.906) (0.336) (0.442) (0.254) (0.187)
Owns Bicycle -0.409 1.612 0.985 -0.454 0.408
(0.674) (0.140) (0.113) (0.417) (0.088)
Owns Computer -2.373∗∗ 1.162 -0.948 -0.220 -0.182
(0.003) (0.162) (0.182) (0.651) (0.310)
Owns Camera 2.090 0.772 0.132 0.508 0.284
(0.169) (0.234) (0.808) (0.293) (0.121)
Owns Cell Phone -0.111 -0.191 -0.156 0.204 0.215
(0.456) (0.173) (0.291) (0.184) (0.226)
Don’t Know Father’s Ed 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Father’s Ed: Grade 1 0.622 -0.449 -1.006 1.220 1.067
(0.424) (0.474) (0.133) (0.092) (0.052)
Father’s Ed: Grade 10 0.324 0.470 -0.389 0.459 -0.332
(0.521) (0.317) (0.495) (0.320) (0.217)
Father’s Ed: Grade 11 4.496 1.553 -0.265 1.696∗ -0.128
(0.100) (0.091) (0.839) (0.030) (0.815)
Father’s Ed: Grade 12 0.950 -0.233 -0.294 0.440 0.00280
(0.087) (0.618) (0.452) (0.336) (0.992)
Father’s Ed: Grade 2 0.870 1.049 0.683 0.401 -0.368
(0.115) (0.070) (0.320) (0.536) (0.659)
Father’s Ed: Grade 3 0.109 0.175 -0.218 -0.0576 -0.428
(0.818) (0.692) (0.671) (0.908) (0.239)
Father’s Ed: Grade 4 0.677 -0.858 0.742 -0.298 0.427
(0.166) (0.087) (0.146) (0.679) (0.514)
Father’s Ed: Grade 5 0.878 -0.587 0.138 -0.622 0.0162
(0.082) (0.349) (0.760) (0.154) (0.973)
Father’s Ed: Grade 6 1.038 -0.342 0.640 0.0577 0.0347
(0.169) (0.441) (0.257) (0.905) (0.934)
Father’s Ed: Grade 7 -0.0167 -1.038∗∗ -0.452 0.266 -0.140
(0.966) (0.010) (0.409) (0.513) (0.682)
Father’s Ed: Grade 8 0.276 0.0982 -0.217 0.428 -0.0981
(0.542) (0.850) (0.562) (0.237) (0.727)
Father’s Ed: Grade 9 0.215 -0.0561 -0.191 0.0757 -0.0984
(0.711) (0.918) (0.684) (0.896) (0.845)
Father’s Ed: Grade R//O -0.635 -1.456 -1.627∗ -0.744 -0.140
(0.380) (0.071) (0.038) (0.113) (0.946)
Father’s Ed: No Schooling 0.308 -0.277 0.0883 0.0507 -0.0123
(0.199) (0.262) (0.731) (0.834) (0.968)
Mothers Ed: Don’t Know 0 0 0 0.775 0
(.) (.) (.) (0.287) (.)
Mothers Ed: Grade 1 -0.569 -0.786 -1.847∗ -0.545 3.168∗
(0.354) (0.369) (0.041) (0.679) (0.020)
Mothers Ed: Grade 10 0.0943 -0.387 0.220 0.0932 0.336
(0.884) (0.444) (0.634) (0.897) (0.233)
Mothers Ed: Grade 11 1.001 0.789 -0.190 -0.520 0.383
(0.240) (0.397) (0.782) (0.647) (0.579)
Mothers Ed: Grade 12 -0.872 0.966 -0.110 0.825 0.197
(0.110) (0.063) (0.821) (0.300) (0.525)
Mothers Ed: Grade 2 -0.245 -0.00755 -0.194 1.001 0.700
(0.623) (0.987) (0.650) (0.191) (0.185)
Mothers Ed: Grade 3 0.0791 0.170 -0.0577 0.794 0.00635
(0.859) (0.668) (0.922) (0.325) (0.990)
Mothers Ed: Grade 4 0.756 0.212 0.113 0.204 0.557
(0.107) (0.577) (0.779) (0.802) (0.245)
Mothers Ed: Grade 5 -0.102 0.106 0.872 0.924 -0.0272
(0.803) (0.817) (0.138) (0.215) (0.952)
Mothers Ed: Grade 6 0.392 0.766 0.354 0.548 -0.0420
(0.417) (0.120) (0.470) (0.467) (0.920)
Mothers Ed: Grade 7 -0.186 -0.149 0.614 1.084 0.289
(0.663) (0.723) (0.162) (0.151) (0.420)
Mothers Ed: Grade 8 -0.396 -0.146 -0.175 0.338 -0.288
(0.283) (0.651) (0.641) (0.644) (0.286)
Mothers Ed: Grade 9 0.442 0.392 -0.145 0.989 -0.134
(0.415) (0.625) (0.846) (0.240) (0.801)
Mothers Ed: Grade R//O -2.694∗∗ 5.178∗∗∗ -0.105 2.664∗ -0.547
(0.009) (0.000) (0.832) (0.041) (0.812)
Mothers Ed: No Schooling -0.164 -0.0262 -0.0443 0.475 -0.397
(0.561) (0.924) (0.870) (0.496) (0.204)
No Driver’s License 0 0 0 0 0
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(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Driver’s License: Refused -1.093∗∗ 0.703 -2.503∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.145) (0.000)
Has Driver’s License 0.782 0.307 -0.631 -0.0705 -0.0969
(0.128) (0.583) (0.091) (0.839) (0.604)
Perceived Health: Don’t Know 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Perceived Health: Excellent -2.987∗∗∗ -0.581 0.370 0.655 0.410
(0.000) (0.196) (0.673) (0.326) (0.617)
Perceived Health: Fair -3.793∗∗∗ -0.310 0.486 0.383 0.195
(0.000) (0.478) (0.592) (0.560) (0.814)
Perceived Health: Good -3.633∗∗∗ -0.587 0.495 0.816 0.160
(0.000) (0.177) (0.578) (0.215) (0.845)
Perceived Health: Poor -3.924∗∗∗ -0.741 0.199 0.0472 -0.524
(0.000) (0.084) (0.829) (0.944) (0.537)
Perceived Health: Very Good -3.305∗∗∗ -0.470 0.598 0.826 0.178
(0.000) (0.284) (0.506) (0.213) (0.828)
Alfred Nzo(DC44) 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Amajuba(DC25) -0.0711 1.094∗ 2.796∗∗∗ 2.307∗∗∗ 2.058
(0.920) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.083)
Amathole(DC12) -0.259 -1.214 1.162 1.404∗
(0.758) (0.072) (0.238) (0.043)
Bojanala(DC37) 0.694 0.523 1.617 2.866∗∗∗ 0.177
(0.396) (0.422) (0.056) (0.000) (0.853)
Buffalo City(BUF) -2.100∗∗ -1.308 3.105∗ 1.117 1.391
(0.001) (0.143) (0.016) (0.090) (0.105)
Cacadu(DC10) -1.870∗∗ 1.051 1.960∗∗ 0.0889 0.606
(0.003) (0.133) (0.008) (0.885) (0.611)
Cape Winelands(DC2) -0.493 1.275∗ 2.154∗∗ 1.264∗ 0.0641
(0.427) (0.032) (0.002) (0.016) (0.911)
Capricorn(DC35) -1.689∗ -0.701 1.349 -0.181 1.601
(0.012) (0.342) (0.183) (0.765) (0.298)
Central Karoo(DC5) 0.822 1.406 2.370∗∗∗ 2.092∗∗∗ 1.781∗∗
(0.437) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
Chris Hani(DC13) -1.093∗ 0.424 1.763∗∗ 1.069∗ 0.182
(0.026) (0.432) (0.001) (0.039) (0.772)
City of Cape Town(CPT) 0.532 -0.644 2.254∗∗ 1.020 0.0339
(0.459) (0.316) (0.002) (0.075) (0.952)
City of Johannesburg(JHB) -0.314 0.672 2.629∗∗∗ 1.273∗ 0.541
(0.627) (0.276) (0.000) (0.011) (0.405)
City of Tshwane(TSH) -0.440 1.393∗ 2.542∗∗∗ 1.518∗ 0.897
(0.511) (0.024) (0.000) (0.012) (0.087)
Dr Kenneth Kaunda(DC40) 1.090 1.608∗ 1.670 1.195 0.606
(0.344) (0.036) (0.050) (0.051) (0.372)
Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati(DC39) -0.0634 0.980 2.248∗∗∗ 0.651 -0.165
(0.912) (0.111) (0.001) (0.332) (0.807)
Eden(DC4) -0.521 0.617 1.939∗ 1.062∗ 0.885
(0.426) (0.693) (0.046) (0.042) (0.128)
Ehlanzeni(DC32) 0.547 1.658∗∗ 3.701∗∗∗ 1.582∗∗ 1.635∗∗
(0.362) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.009)
Ekurhuleni(EKU) -1.013 1.273∗ 1.631∗ 0.461 0.602
(0.291) (0.020) (0.014) (0.549) (0.286)
Fezile Dabi(DC20) -0.571 0.367 3.621∗∗ 1.524∗∗ 0.357
(0.510) (0.807) (0.003) (0.009) (0.598)
Frances Baard(DC9) -0.688 -1.046 2.282∗∗ 1.080∗ -0.508
(0.497) (0.198) (0.001) (0.028) (0.543)
Gert Sibande(DC30) 0.444 1.754∗∗ 2.675∗∗∗ 1.615∗∗∗ 1.022
(0.518) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.111)
Greater Sekhukhune(DC47) -0.198 0.230 2.760∗∗∗ 1.149∗ 0.595
(0.781) (0.738) (0.000) (0.023) (0.464)
Joe Gqabi(DC14) 0.321 0.357 1.438∗∗ 0.765 -0.608
(0.563) (0.491) (0.008) (0.087) (0.424)
John Taolo Gaetsewe(DC45) 0.694 2.080∗∗ 2.214∗∗ 1.675 0.460
(0.315) (0.001) (0.002) (0.091) (0.632)
Lejweleputswa(DC18) 0.00237 1.142 2.543∗∗∗ 1.549∗ -0.453
(0.997) (0.130) (0.000) (0.015) (0.574)
Mangaung(MAN) -0.570 0.0334 4.798∗∗∗ -0.502 0.752
(0.679) (0.974) (0.000) (0.525) (0.307)
Mopani(DC33) -0.696 -0.0239 0.391 -0.595 -0.423
(0.234) (0.972) (0.500) (0.442) (0.565)
Namakwa(DC6) 2.471∗ 1.329 2.927∗∗∗ 1.524∗ 0.934
(0.028) (0.288) (0.001) (0.018) (0.144)
Nelson Mandela Bay(NMA) -0.0988 0.276 1.614∗∗ 1.351∗∗ 0.975
(0.876) (0.650) (0.008) (0.009) (0.085)
Ngaka Modiri Molema(DC38) -0.0151 0.770 1.255∗ 0.357 -1.041
(0.982) (0.244) (0.036) (0.494) (0.126)
Nkangala(DC31) -0.699 1.318 1.725∗∗ 0.982 0.793
(0.182) (0.116) (0.006) (0.091) (0.158)
O.R.Tambo(DC15) 0.764 1.224 2.320∗∗ 1.737∗ -0.529
(0.149) (0.066) (0.001) (0.049) (0.416)
Overberg(DC3) 1.824 0.743 2.039∗∗ 1.622∗∗ 0.708
(0.051) (0.327) (0.007) (0.002) (0.197)
Pixley ka Seme(DC7) 1.507∗ 2.123∗∗ 2.917∗∗∗ 1.968∗∗ 1.524∗
(0.046) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.016)
Sedibeng(DC42) -0.360 0.367 1.679∗∗ 1.460∗∗ 0.117
(0.563) (0.514) (0.009) (0.005) (0.855)
Sisonke(DC43) 0.0236 0.478 1.332∗∗ 0.511 0.222
(0.961) (0.331) (0.008) (0.219) (0.702)
Siyanda(DC8) -1.112 -0.535 2.380∗∗ 0.368 -0.0551
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(0.481) (0.379) (0.004) (0.620) (0.929)
Thabo Mofutsanyane(DC19) 1.383∗ 0.925 3.114∗∗∗ 1.202 0.814
(0.025) (0.141) (0.000) (0.069) (0.273)
UMgungundlovu(DC22) -1.312∗ 0.215 1.734∗ -0.145 -0.102
(0.018) (0.725) (0.011) (0.798) (0.864)
Ugu(DC21) -0.681 -0.0168 1.380∗ 0.692 -0.394
(0.196) (0.971) (0.012) (0.093) (0.488)
Umkhanyakude(DC27) -1.510∗∗ -0.406 1.239∗ 1.452∗ -0.629
(0.003) (0.427) (0.039) (0.018) (0.272)
Umzinyathi(DC24) -1.397∗ 0.657 0.802 -0.318 0.832
(0.015) (0.207) (0.152) (0.611) (0.209)
Uthukela(DC23) -0.870 -0.0828 1.831∗∗∗ 0.708 1.660
(0.068) (0.879) (0.001) (0.177) (0.398)
Uthungulu(DC28) -0.221 0.734 1.228∗ 0.547 -0.952
(0.710) (0.149) (0.050) (0.371) (0.259)
Vhembe(DC34) -0.773 1.879 1.807∗ -0.330 0.957
(0.315) (0.060) (0.041) (0.758) (0.344)
Waterberg(DC36) -0.503 0.395 -0.0199 0.136 -0.0467
(0.536) (0.667) (0.977) (0.774) (0.941)
West Coast(DC1) 1.288 2.091∗ 1.907∗ 1.550∗∗ 0.288
(0.082) (0.023) (0.045) (0.008) (0.616)
West Rand(DC48) 2.083 1.585 0.926 -0.0141 0.147
(0.057) (0.059) (0.337) (0.981) (0.840)
Xhariep(DC16) 0.203 0.666 3.273∗∗∗ 1.453∗ 0.252
(0.796) (0.274) (0.000) (0.047) (0.674)
Zululand(DC26) -0.630 -0.122 1.183∗ 0.484 -0.873
(0.258) (0.820) (0.046) (0.381) (0.156)
eThekwini(ETH) -0.481 -1.154∗ 1.655∗ 0.435 0.607
(0.454) (0.036) (0.010) (0.525) (0.365)
iLembe(DC29) -0.874 -0.465 1.673∗ 0.0632 0.360
(0.101) (0.425) (0.022) (0.936) (0.649)
Above Average Income 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Average Income -0.190 0.0157 -0.730∗ -0.487 -0.519∗∗
(0.702) (0.971) (0.019) (0.114) (0.002)
Below Average Income -1.484∗∗ -1.157∗∗ -1.777∗∗∗ -1.317∗∗∗ -1.430∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative Income: Don’t Know 0.817 1.179∗ -0.503 0.0358 -0.323
(0.168) (0.046) (0.341) (0.942) (0.405)
Much Above Average Income -0.621 1.159∗ -0.491 0.340 0.689
(0.407) (0.032) (0.556) (0.499) (0.131)
Much Below Average Income -1.738∗∗∗ -1.808∗∗∗ -2.215∗∗∗ -1.929∗∗∗ -2.775∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Drinks Alcohol: 1-2 Days A Week 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Drinks Alcohol: 3-4 Days A Week -0.679 -2.005∗∗ -1.761∗ -0.727 0.483
(0.263) (0.002) (0.010) (0.351) (0.387)
Drinks Alcohol: 5-6 Days a Week -0.808 -1.715 -1.280 0.201 0.341
(0.285) (0.152) (0.218) (0.840) (0.709)
Drinks Alcohol: < 1 Days a Week -1.416 0.189 0.655 -1.243 -0.0233
(0.083) (0.817) (0.429) (0.098) (0.958)
Drinks Alcohol: Very Rarely -0.336 0.222 -0.142 -0.723 0.218
(0.570) (0.647) (0.795) (0.096) (0.482)
Drinks Alcohol: Everyday -0.163 0.392 -0.134 -0.760 0.581
(0.938) (0.605) (0.921) (0.513) (0.265)
Drinks Alcohol: Never Has -0.638 0.178 -0.113 -0.642 0.261
(0.223) (0.675) (0.820) (0.096) (0.386)
Drinks Alcohol: No Longer Drinks -0.474 0.384 -0.374 -0.254 0.530
(0.374) (0.395) (0.459) (0.578) (0.120)
Smoking: Doesn’t Know 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Smoking: No 0.397 1.609 -0.622 1.423∗ 4.278
(0.483) (0.109) (0.365) (0.049) (0.124)
Smoking: Yes 0.300 1.361 -0.924 1.127 3.917
(0.617) (0.174) (0.190) (0.135) (0.160)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head -0.494 -0.437 -0.366 -0.0977 -0.306
(0.144) (0.139) (0.217) (0.703) (0.338)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -1.347∗ 0.000327
(0.019) (1.000)
Smoking: Not Applicable -1.398
(0.122)
Mothers Ed: Cert w < Grade 12 0
(.)
Father’s Ed: Refused 1.386∗
(0.040)
Mothers Ed: Refused 0
(.)
Constant 8.400∗∗∗ 3.298∗ 5.342∗∗∗ 3.897∗∗ 1.257
(0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.004) (0.681)
Observations 1068 1070 1066 1068 1067
R2 0.384 0.361 0.301 0.319 0.368
Root MSE 2.035 1.924 2.020 2.009 1.917
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.3 EWB Full Regression Tables
Table 24: EWB Full Regression
OLS OLS OLS OLOGIT OLOGIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EWB Score EWB Score Happy Happy Happy
Empowerment Factor Score -0.0533∗∗ 0.0208
(0.004) (0.547)
Main decision-maker -0.0435 0.0112 0.0103
(0.196) (0.741) (0.872)
Age -0.0120∗ -0.00984 -0.00428 -0.00939 -0.0105
(0.016) (0.052) (0.379) (0.296) (0.245)
Age2 0.000139∗∗ 0.000121∗ 0.0000582 0.000131 0.000140
(0.006) (0.018) (0.225) (0.137) (0.113)
Household Income 0.0387 0.0352 0.0106 0.0303 0.0320
(10,000’s R) (0.060) (0.089) (0.648) (0.585) (0.565)
Household Food Expenditure 0.265 0.244 0.749∗∗ 1.725∗∗ 1.741∗∗
(10,000’s R) (0.287) (0.326) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Household Non-Food Expenditure -0.0868∗ -0.0854∗ 0.0122 0.00112 0.000438
(10,000’s R) (0.012) (0.013) (0.731) (0.989) (0.996)
Asian 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Asian/Indian -0.0719 -0.0726 0.460∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗ 0.741∗∗
(0.569) (0.564) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Coloured 0.0253 0.0208 0.292∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗
(0.707) (0.757) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White 0.219∗ 0.212∗ 0.171 0.227 0.230
(0.012) (0.015) (0.062) (0.232) (0.227)
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Employed 0.0459 0.0519 0.0346 0.0793 0.0763
(0.199) (0.145) (0.369) (0.286) (0.303)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Living with partner 0.211∗ 0.178∗ 0.0924 0.188 0.203
(0.013) (0.039) (0.259) (0.222) (0.192)
Married 0.237∗∗ 0.197∗ 0.0634 0.155 0.173
(0.002) (0.012) (0.377) (0.254) (0.212)
Never Married 0.173∗ 0.165∗ 0.0479 0.132 0.135
(0.030) (0.039) (0.523) (0.351) (0.338)
Widow/Widower 0.0899 0.0898 0.0293 0.0639 0.0637
(0.273) (0.274) (0.702) (0.657) (0.658)
Owns Radio -0.0205 -0.0140 -0.00212 -0.00729 -0.0106
(0.506) (0.651) (0.946) (0.902) (0.858)
Owns Stereo -0.0107 -0.00509 0.0471 0.106 0.103
(0.778) (0.893) (0.238) (0.172) (0.184)
Owns Sewing Machine -0.0567 -0.0612 0.0544 0.106 0.108
(0.313) (0.276) (0.353) (0.363) (0.355)
Owns Car -0.00399 -0.00191 0.187∗∗ 0.409∗∗ 0.408∗∗
(0.950) (0.976) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Owns Bicycle -0.162 -0.163 -0.0535 -0.0971 -0.0966
(0.098) (0.096) (0.613) (0.676) (0.678)
Owns Computer -0.00948 -0.00560 -0.0596 -0.188 -0.190
(0.890) (0.935) (0.460) (0.278) (0.273)
Owns Camera 0.172∗ 0.172∗ -0.0136 0.0124 0.0131
(0.010) (0.010) (0.870) (0.946) (0.943)
Owns Cell Phone 0.0409 0.0436 0.0411 0.110 0.108
(0.203) (0.175) (0.194) (0.060) (0.064)
Don’t Know Father’s Ed 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Father’s Ed: Grade 1 0.170 0.172 0.0484 0.156 0.156
(0.358) (0.350) (0.805) (0.680) (0.680)
Father’s Ed: Grade 10 -0.0880 -0.0878 0.232∗∗ 0.484∗∗ 0.484∗∗
(0.343) (0.344) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Father’s Ed: Grade 11 0.0523 0.0560 -0.144 -0.277 -0.278
(0.785) (0.770) (0.447) (0.465) (0.461)
Father’s Ed: Grade 12 0.0432 0.0492 0.117 0.227 0.225
(0.561) (0.507) (0.148) (0.159) (0.163)
Father’s Ed: Grade 2 -0.134 -0.131 0.00465 0.00843 0.00729
(0.380) (0.388) (0.971) (0.970) (0.974)
Father’s Ed: Grade 3 -0.283∗ -0.276∗ -0.0294 -0.0738 -0.0770
(0.014) (0.016) (0.794) (0.726) (0.714)
Father’s Ed: Grade 4 0.0108 0.0141 -0.114 -0.169 -0.170
(0.904) (0.874) (0.281) (0.379) (0.377)
Father’s Ed: Grade 5 -0.350∗∗ -0.348∗∗ 0.0521 0.0868 0.0857
(0.002) (0.002) (0.629) (0.669) (0.673)
Father’s Ed: Grade 6 -0.00726 -0.00551 0.135 0.300 0.300
(0.936) (0.951) (0.230) (0.155) (0.155)
Father’s Ed: Grade 7 -0.101 -0.0984 -0.0285 -0.0543 -0.0546
(0.305) (0.316) (0.754) (0.749) (0.747)
Father’s Ed: Grade 8 -0.0698 -0.0665 0.0466 0.123 0.122
(0.339) (0.362) (0.548) (0.402) (0.407)
Father’s Ed: Grade 9 -0.0751 -0.0728 0.171 0.271 0.271
(0.459) (0.471) (0.120) (0.202) (0.202)
Father’s Ed: Grade R//O -0.108 -0.0943 -0.589 -1.044 -1.045
(0.767) (0.800) (0.060) (0.081) (0.082)
Father’s Ed: No Schooling -0.0315 -0.0287 -0.0510 -0.0921 -0.0929
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(0.535) (0.572) (0.325) (0.342) (0.338)
Father’s Ed: Refused 0.379 0.338 0.638∗ 12.81∗∗∗ 12.82∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.145) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Cert w < Grade 12 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Mothers Ed: Don’t Know 0.0759 0.0884 1.800∗∗∗ 14.72∗∗∗ 14.71∗∗∗
(0.623) (0.567) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 1 -0.0447 -0.0306 1.631∗∗∗ 14.40∗∗∗ 14.40∗∗∗
(0.875) (0.914) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 10 0.0645 0.0712 1.720∗∗∗ 14.61∗∗∗ 14.61∗∗∗
(0.691) (0.661) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 11 0.0821 0.0940 1.741∗∗∗ 14.69∗∗∗ 14.68∗∗∗
(0.681) (0.637) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 12 -0.0172 -0.00673 1.782∗∗∗ 14.74∗∗∗ 14.73∗∗∗
(0.918) (0.968) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 2 0.195 0.206 1.596∗∗∗ 14.31∗∗∗ 14.30∗∗∗
(0.255) (0.229) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 3 -0.0161 -0.00583 1.701∗∗∗ 14.53∗∗∗ 14.53∗∗∗
(0.924) (0.973) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 4 0.0200 0.0276 1.781∗∗∗ 14.70∗∗∗ 14.70∗∗∗
(0.904) (0.867) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 5 0.0125 0.0272 1.754∗∗∗ 14.63∗∗∗ 14.63∗∗∗
(0.939) (0.869) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 6 0.182 0.197 1.752∗∗∗ 14.66∗∗∗ 14.65∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.209) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 7 0.148 0.156 1.770∗∗∗ 14.72∗∗∗ 14.71∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.334) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 8 -0.0485 -0.0373 1.774∗∗∗ 14.66∗∗∗ 14.66∗∗∗
(0.756) (0.811) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade 9 -0.0193 -0.00945 1.571∗∗∗ 14.28∗∗∗ 14.28∗∗∗
(0.916) (0.959) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: Grade R//O -0.0599 -0.0566 1.956∗∗∗ 14.97∗∗∗ 14.97∗∗∗
(0.887) (0.895) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mothers Ed: No Schooling -0.00495 0.00644 1.712∗∗∗ 14.57∗∗∗ 14.56∗∗∗
(0.974) (0.967) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No Driver’s License 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Driver’s License: Refused -0.0751 -0.0768 0.0778 0.141 0.142
(0.920) (0.919) (0.795) (0.761) (0.759)
Has Driver’s License 0.000419 0.00207 0.0285 0.0982 0.0971
(0.995) (0.975) (0.694) (0.499) (0.504)
Perceived Health: Don’t Know 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Perceived Health: Excellent 0.876∗∗ 0.869∗∗ -0.0114 -0.124 -0.122
(0.003) (0.003) (0.981) (0.903) (0.904)
Perceived Health: Fair 0.485 0.478 -0.263 -0.635 -0.634
(0.102) (0.105) (0.574) (0.531) (0.531)
Perceived Health: Good 0.654∗ 0.646∗ -0.170 -0.468 -0.467
(0.027) (0.028) (0.715) (0.644) (0.644)
Perceived Health: Poor 0.0538 0.0467 -0.346 -0.774 -0.774
(0.857) (0.875) (0.460) (0.445) (0.445)
Perceived Health: Very Good 0.715∗ 0.709∗ -0.125 -0.358 -0.357
(0.016) (0.016) (0.789) (0.724) (0.724)
Alfred Nzo(DC44) 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Amajuba(DC25) 0.205 0.181 0.108 0.132 0.142
(0.150) (0.203) (0.369) (0.498) (0.467)
Amathole(DC12) 0.708∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ -0.0701 -0.109 -0.102
(0.000) (0.000) (0.670) (0.689) (0.710)
Bojanala(DC37) -0.181 -0.182 0.242 0.421 0.422
(0.340) (0.335) (0.126) (0.162) (0.161)
Buffalo City(BUF) 0.551∗∗ 0.548∗∗ -0.508∗ -0.948∗ -0.949∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)
Cacadu(DC10) -0.0817 -0.0844 -0.0508 -0.106 -0.106
(0.638) (0.627) (0.730) (0.687) (0.688)
Cape Winelands(DC2) 0.524∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ -0.299∗ -0.629∗ -0.631∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013)
Capricorn(DC35) 0.0995 0.0956 -0.150 -0.348 -0.346
(0.480) (0.498) (0.309) (0.185) (0.188)
Central Karoo(DC5) 0.543∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Chris Hani(DC13) 0.949∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ -0.0529 -0.100 -0.0968
(0.000) (0.000) (0.622) (0.563) (0.577)
City of Cape Town(CPT) 0.559∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ -0.0398 -0.0383 -0.0373
(0.000) (0.000) (0.760) (0.882) (0.885)
City of Johannesburg(JHB) 0.320∗∗ 0.319∗∗ 0.200 0.388 0.389
(0.008) (0.008) (0.104) (0.094) (0.093)
City of Tshwane(TSH) 0.462∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Dr Kenneth Kaunda(DC40) 0.466∗∗ 0.463∗∗ 0.0459 0.132 0.134
(0.002) (0.002) (0.760) (0.645) (0.639)
Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati(DC39) 0.116 0.107 0.0581 0.0922 0.0963
(0.415) (0.452) (0.643) (0.667) (0.653)
Eden(DC4) 0.541∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.272∗ 0.559∗ 0.562∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.024) (0.023)
Ehlanzeni(DC32) 0.470∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ekurhuleni(EKU) 0.302∗ 0.300∗ 0.154 0.179 0.180
(0.029) (0.030) (0.224) (0.443) (0.441)
Fezile Dabi(DC20) 0.428∗∗ 0.418∗∗ 0.159 0.247 0.253
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(0.005) (0.006) (0.339) (0.428) (0.419)
Frances Baard(DC9) 0.225 0.224 0.350∗ 0.588∗ 0.588∗
(0.151) (0.153) (0.017) (0.029) (0.029)
Gert Sibande(DC30) 0.445∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗ 0.604∗∗ 0.609∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Greater Sekhukhune(DC47) 0.124 0.114 0.470∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.334) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Joe Gqabi(DC14) 0.596∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ -0.375∗∗ -0.678∗∗ -0.675∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
John Taolo Gaetsewe(DC45) 0.264∗ 0.248 0.185 0.265 0.271
(0.038) (0.050) (0.159) (0.227) (0.216)
Lejweleputswa(DC18) -0.0589 -0.0642 0.435∗∗ 0.873∗∗ 0.875∗∗
(0.697) (0.670) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mangaung(MAN) 0.182 0.172 0.151 0.258 0.264
(0.368) (0.398) (0.400) (0.446) (0.436)
Mopani(DC33) 0.337∗ 0.341∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Namakwa(DC6) 0.279 0.288 0.370∗ 0.921∗∗ 0.917∗∗
(0.058) (0.051) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003)
Nelson Mandela Bay(NMA) 0.389∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗ -0.169 -0.300 -0.296
(0.001) (0.001) (0.127) (0.092) (0.096)
Ngaka Modiri Molema(DC38) -0.101 -0.112 0.173 0.275 0.281
(0.406) (0.355) (0.118) (0.139) (0.131)
Nkangala(DC31) 0.500∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.302∗ 0.503∗ 0.505∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.030) (0.029)
O.R.Tambo(DC15) 0.0630 0.0610 -0.324∗∗ -0.548∗∗ -0.547∗∗
(0.630) (0.642) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Overberg(DC3) 0.612∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.293∗ 0.581∗ 0.585∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Pixley ka Seme(DC7) 0.832∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.191 0.393 0.397
(0.000) (0.000) (0.258) (0.209) (0.204)
Sedibeng(DC42) 0.0272 0.0201 0.383∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗
(0.834) (0.877) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sisonke(DC43) 0.194 0.187 -0.454∗∗∗ -0.733∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.098) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Siyanda(DC8) 0.468∗∗ 0.464∗∗ 0.269 0.477 0.478
(0.002) (0.003) (0.083) (0.099) (0.098)
Thabo Mofutsanyane(DC19) 0.397∗ 0.389∗ 0.127 0.253 0.258
(0.013) (0.015) (0.436) (0.488) (0.479)
UMgungundlovu(DC22) 0.260∗ 0.248∗ -0.0441 -0.101 -0.0968
(0.021) (0.027) (0.650) (0.507) (0.526)
Ugu(DC21) 0.139 0.131 -0.168 -0.298∗ -0.294
(0.220) (0.248) (0.079) (0.049) (0.053)
Umkhanyakude(DC27) 0.169 0.163 -0.187 -0.322 -0.319
(0.283) (0.300) (0.082) (0.062) (0.065)
Umzinyathi(DC24) 0.386∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗ -0.0348 -0.0792 -0.0734
(0.001) (0.001) (0.734) (0.630) (0.656)
Uthukela(DC23) 0.406∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗ -0.520∗∗ -0.516∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Uthungulu(DC28) 0.140 0.122 -0.0333 -0.0834 -0.0757
(0.283) (0.350) (0.757) (0.623) (0.656)
Vhembe(DC34) 0.149 0.150 -0.0489 -0.147 -0.148
(0.402) (0.397) (0.766) (0.626) (0.623)
Waterberg(DC36) 0.405∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 1.118∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
West Coast(DC1) 0.727∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 1.048∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
West Rand(DC48) -0.106 -0.113 0.149 0.193 0.197
(0.497) (0.469) (0.311) (0.455) (0.447)
Xhariep(DC16) 0.277∗ 0.273∗ 0.279 0.575 0.578
(0.038) (0.040) (0.074) (0.068) (0.067)
Zululand(DC26) 0.408∗∗ 0.397∗∗ -0.126 -0.247 -0.241
(0.003) (0.004) (0.266) (0.201) (0.212)
eThekwini(ETH) 0.426∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ -0.281∗ -0.515∗∗ -0.512∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
iLembe(DC29) 0.314∗∗ 0.300∗ -0.291∗∗ -0.515∗∗ -0.510∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Above Average Income 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Average Income 0.0305 0.0308 0.0725 0.163 0.162
(0.599) (0.594) (0.254) (0.205) (0.207)
Below Average Income -0.116 -0.113 0.0397 0.109 0.107
(0.056) (0.062) (0.549) (0.411) (0.419)
Relative Income: Don’t Know -0.0115 -0.00370 -0.0217 -0.0267 -0.0313
(0.888) (0.964) (0.812) (0.881) (0.861)
Much Above Average Income -0.418∗∗∗ -0.411∗∗∗ -0.206 -0.404 -0.407
(0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.075) (0.073)
Much Below Average Income -0.456∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ 0.0821 0.200 0.198
(0.000) (0.000) (0.251) (0.159) (0.164)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -1.820 -1.817 0.387 0.757 0.753
(0.056) (0.052) (0.479) (0.519) (0.525)
Drinks Alcohol: 1-2 Days A Week 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Drinks Alcohol: 3-4 Days A Week -0.242 -0.236 -0.247 -0.450 -0.451
(0.237) (0.249) (0.142) (0.156) (0.155)
Drinks Alcohol: 5-6 Days a Week -0.300 -0.310 -0.343 -0.571 -0.567
(0.185) (0.169) (0.157) (0.206) (0.210)
Drinks Alcohol: < 1 Days a Week -0.217 -0.208 -0.175 -0.347 -0.351
(0.104) (0.120) (0.197) (0.178) (0.173)
Drinks Alcohol: Very Rarely -0.00269 -0.00483 -0.0373 -0.0189 -0.0175
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(0.975) (0.956) (0.702) (0.922) (0.927)
Drinks Alcohol: Everyday -0.251 -0.257 -0.179 -0.447 -0.442
(0.168) (0.162) (0.213) (0.121) (0.125)
Drinks Alcohol: Never Has -0.0211 -0.0209 -0.0103 -0.0137 -0.0130
(0.794) (0.796) (0.907) (0.936) (0.939)
Drinks Alcohol: No Longer Drinks -0.108 -0.108 -0.0902 -0.168 -0.168
(0.233) (0.230) (0.352) (0.371) (0.372)
Smoking: Doesn’t Know 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Smoking: No 0.492 0.495 0.295 0.521 0.521
(0.337) (0.335) (0.517) (0.640) (0.639)
Smoking: Not Applicable 0.481 0.515 -0.548 -0.891 -0.904
(0.363) (0.332) (0.249) (0.436) (0.429)
Smoking: Yes 0.294 0.297 0.248 0.421 0.421
(0.567) (0.565) (0.587) (0.706) (0.706)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head 0.0493 0.0314 0.00817 0.00299 0.0116
(0.395) (0.589) (0.898) (0.980) (0.922)
Constant -1.266∗ -1.333∗ 0.506
(0.047) (0.037) (0.463)
cut1
Constant 13.59∗∗∗ 13.56∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
cut2
Constant 14.96∗∗∗ 14.93∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
cut3
Constant 16.45∗∗∗ 16.42∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 5339 5339 5339 5339 5339
R2 0.191 0.192 0.161
Pseudo R2 0.069 0.069
Root MSE 0.986 0.985 0.984
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
A.4 EWB Full Regression Tables By Income Quintiles
Table 25: EWB Full Regression By Income Quintiles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quint 1 Quint 2 Quint 3 Quint 4 Quint 5
Empowerment Factor Score 0.0246 -0.119∗∗ -0.0445 -0.0201 -0.0849∗
(0.592) (0.010) (0.347) (0.657) (0.033)
Age -0.00279 -0.0120 -0.0136 -0.00645 0.0100
(0.823) (0.277) (0.186) (0.592) (0.444)
Age2 0.0000263 0.000177 0.000133 0.000114 -0.0000728
(0.842) (0.102) (0.191) (0.347) (0.579)
Household Income 0.106 1.063 0.491 -0.132 0.0362
(10,000’s R) (0.932) (0.522) (0.691) (0.768) (0.080)
Household Food Expenditure -0.160 0.275 0.276 0.953 -0.226
(10,000’s R) (0.887) (0.827) (0.759) (0.161) (0.513)
Household Non-Food Expenditure 0.128 0.102 -0.409 0.0824 -0.0773∗
(10,000’s R) (0.644) (0.597) (0.182) (0.427) (0.039)
Asian 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Asian/Indian -0.216 0.101 -0.268 -0.426 0.0890
(0.549) (0.858) (0.423) (0.257) (0.602)
Coloured -0.211 -0.151 -0.229 0.0699 0.0739
(0.353) (0.438) (0.245) (0.601) (0.558)
White 0.740 -0.959 0.463 0.324 0.143
(0.053) (0.139) (0.350) (0.118) (0.222)
Unemployed 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Employed -0.0134 -0.118 0.130 0.0483 0.0871
(0.917) (0.219) (0.155) (0.543) (0.181)
Divorced/Separated 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Living with partner -0.00226 0.355 -0.103 0.290 -0.00961
(0.991) (0.082) (0.587) (0.177) (0.964)
Married -0.0782 0.323 0.01000 0.313 0.254
(0.685) (0.101) (0.957) (0.109) (0.095)
Never Married -0.196 0.318 -0.0919 0.409∗ 0.231
(0.294) (0.097) (0.613) (0.049) (0.186)
Widow/Widower -0.225 0.230 -0.139 0.170 0.130
(0.245) (0.246) (0.443) (0.411) (0.455)
Owns Radio 0.0384 -0.0470 -0.136 0.0260 0.107
(0.611) (0.505) (0.064) (0.725) (0.110)
Owns Stereo -0.0518 -0.147 0.0302 0.0121 0.0392
(0.634) (0.162) (0.755) (0.885) (0.576)
Owns Sewing Machine -0.504 0.624∗∗∗ -0.0926 -0.320∗ -0.0669
(0.236) (0.000) (0.597) (0.011) (0.388)
Owns Car 0.579 -0.265 -0.424 -0.180 0.0197
(0.194) (0.389) (0.227) (0.210) (0.806)
Owns Bicycle -0.586 0.325 -0.391 -0.287 -0.181
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(0.120) (0.196) (0.228) (0.272) (0.166)
Owns Computer -0.616 -0.0757 0.240 -0.0993 -0.0477
(0.104) (0.859) (0.492) (0.616) (0.565)
Owns Camera 0.558 0.352 0.246 0.170 0.156
(0.308) (0.145) (0.451) (0.424) (0.060)
Owns Cell Phone -0.0684 0.125 0.0315 0.139 -0.1000
(0.367) (0.073) (0.665) (0.063) (0.225)
Don’t Know Father’s Ed 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Father’s Ed: Grade 1 0.450 0.0439 -0.423 0.654 -0.0381
(0.522) (0.900) (0.383) (0.077) (0.922)
Father’s Ed: Grade 10 -0.407 -0.499 -0.295 0.529∗∗ -0.0259
(0.094) (0.151) (0.371) (0.003) (0.837)
Father’s Ed: Grade 11 1.112∗∗ 0.119 0.311 -0.181 -0.0254
(0.007) (0.752) (0.486) (0.743) (0.907)
Father’s Ed: Grade 12 -0.0394 -0.0807 0.0733 0.312 -0.0174
(0.870) (0.781) (0.753) (0.059) (0.884)
Father’s Ed: Grade 2 0.467 -0.466 -0.201 0.123 -1.112∗
(0.094) (0.119) (0.517) (0.788) (0.033)
Father’s Ed: Grade 3 0.0513 -0.665∗∗ 0.152 -0.260 -0.567∗
(0.804) (0.005) (0.570) (0.480) (0.048)
Father’s Ed: Grade 4 0.0619 0.264 -0.0904 -0.301 -0.165
(0.744) (0.247) (0.548) (0.323) (0.442)
Father’s Ed: Grade 5 -0.0804 -0.257 -0.836∗ -0.640∗ -0.232
(0.695) (0.396) (0.010) (0.016) (0.309)
Father’s Ed: Grade 6 -0.0314 0.129 -0.0166 0.00629 0.0159
(0.890) (0.477) (0.944) (0.977) (0.930)
Father’s Ed: Grade 7 -0.232 -0.173 0.101 0.180 -0.220
(0.421) (0.525) (0.592) (0.397) (0.252)
Father’s Ed: Grade 8 -0.317 0.0281 -0.295 0.247 -0.106
(0.212) (0.876) (0.156) (0.156) (0.370)
Father’s Ed: Grade 9 -0.182 0.0927 -0.149 0.148 -0.0423
(0.521) (0.629) (0.533) (0.517) (0.848)
Father’s Ed: Grade R//O 0.0194 -0.584 0.388 0.283 0.820
(0.984) (0.098) (0.303) (0.380) (0.197)
Father’s Ed: No Schooling -0.0524 -0.0685 -0.0518 0.0806 0.0626
(0.636) (0.601) (0.621) (0.484) (0.673)
Mothers Ed: Don’t Know 0 0 0 0.937∗∗ 0
(.) (.) (.) (0.004) (.)
Mothers Ed: Grade 1 -0.364 1.323∗∗ 0.132 0.285 0.218
(0.320) (0.006) (0.759) (0.771) (0.552)
Mothers Ed: Grade 10 -0.0204 0.378 -0.519∗ 0.860∗∗ 0.108
(0.924) (0.134) (0.032) (0.008) (0.410)
Mothers Ed: Grade 11 0.431 -0.136 -0.398 1.062∗ -0.143
(0.102) (0.702) (0.269) (0.031) (0.543)
Mothers Ed: Grade 12 0.0996 -0.197 -0.110 0.755∗ -0.00590
(0.687) (0.564) (0.650) (0.041) (0.965)
Mothers Ed: Grade 2 -0.150 0.343 0.291 1.299∗∗∗ 0.218
(0.446) (0.115) (0.117) (0.000) (0.366)
Mothers Ed: Grade 3 0.118 -0.0898 -0.297 1.247∗∗∗ -0.378
(0.584) (0.729) (0.284) (0.000) (0.211)
Mothers Ed: Grade 4 0.168 -0.271 0.0452 1.236∗∗∗ -0.227
(0.420) (0.212) (0.828) (0.000) (0.298)
Mothers Ed: Grade 5 0.0232 -0.0601 0.118 0.818∗ -0.194
(0.918) (0.820) (0.697) (0.017) (0.428)
Mothers Ed: Grade 6 0.0292 0.195 0.394∗ 0.801∗ 0.133
(0.877) (0.317) (0.040) (0.016) (0.466)
Mothers Ed: Grade 7 0.129 0.0774 0.109 0.778∗ 0.102
(0.580) (0.646) (0.597) (0.019) (0.452)
Mothers Ed: Grade 8 -0.126 -0.0593 -0.166 0.805∗ -0.157
(0.459) (0.700) (0.385) (0.015) (0.192)
Mothers Ed: Grade 9 0.372 0.269 -0.117 0.612 -0.364
(0.061) (0.273) (0.615) (0.149) (0.207)
Mothers Ed: Grade R//O -0.709 0.360 0.425 0.313 -1.133∗∗
(0.489) (0.487) (0.140) (0.652) (0.010)
Mothers Ed: No Schooling -0.0213 0.0477 -0.0781 0.902∗∗ -0.347∗
(0.873) (0.732) (0.491) (0.004) (0.015)
No Driver’s License 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Driver’s License: Refused -1.299∗∗∗ 1.765∗∗∗ -0.807∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Has Driver’s License -0.403 0.278 -0.0730 0.0742 -0.0277
(0.087) (0.370) (0.733) (0.706) (0.723)
Perceived Health: Don’t Know 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Perceived Health: Excellent -0.501 0.370 1.350 1.053∗∗∗ 1.294∗∗
(0.061) (0.154) (0.115) (0.000) (0.002)
Perceived Health: Fair -0.831∗∗ -0.0882 0.827 0.478∗ 1.022∗
(0.003) (0.729) (0.337) (0.029) (0.013)
Perceived Health: Good -0.696∗ 0.136 0.975 0.692∗∗ 1.112∗∗
(0.012) (0.591) (0.255) (0.002) (0.006)
Perceived Health: Poor -1.392∗∗∗ -0.600∗ 0.543 0.126 0.522
(0.000) (0.018) (0.531) (0.583) (0.219)
Perceived Health: Very Good -0.601∗ 0.135 0.982 0.851∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗
(0.025) (0.602) (0.254) (0.000) (0.004)
Alfred Nzo(DC44) 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Amajuba(DC25) 0.0878 0.475∗ 0.152 0.0762 -1.222∗∗∗
(0.813) (0.043) (0.733) (0.792) (0.000)
Amathole(DC12) 0.450 0.731∗∗ 1.211∗∗ 0.289
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(0.207) (0.006) (0.004) (0.612)
Bojanala(DC37) 0.168 -0.113 -0.547 -0.337 0.585
(0.511) (0.783) (0.351) (0.486) (0.100)
Buffalo City(BUF) 0.332 0.646∗∗ 1.630∗∗ -0.325 0.968∗
(0.401) (0.005) (0.009) (0.655) (0.010)
Cacadu(DC10) 0.0823 -0.654∗ 0.404 -0.00328 0.282
(0.801) (0.011) (0.477) (0.993) (0.441)
Cape Winelands(DC2) 0.452 0.648∗ 1.035∗ 0.596∗ 0.534∗
(0.145) (0.023) (0.018) (0.044) (0.043)
Capricorn(DC35) 0.252 -0.0594 0.527 -0.0741 0.338
(0.267) (0.880) (0.288) (0.810) (0.557)
Central Karoo(DC5) 0.439 0.212 1.058∗ 0.310 1.137∗∗∗
(0.516) (0.628) (0.021) (0.354) (0.000)
Chris Hani(DC13) 1.322∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗ 1.046∗∗ 0.562∗ 1.574∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.050) (0.000)
City of Cape Town(CPT) 0.654 1.495∗∗∗ 0.577 0.314 0.509∗
(0.051) (0.000) (0.188) (0.325) (0.043)
City of Johannesburg(JHB) 0.310 0.477 0.622 0.0204 0.582
(0.202) (0.072) (0.149) (0.944) (0.058)
City of Tshwane(TSH) 0.525 0.971∗∗∗ 0.658 -0.0984 0.577∗
(0.061) (0.000) (0.130) (0.756) (0.016)
Dr Kenneth Kaunda(DC40) 0.120 0.00689 0.220 0.812∗ 0.623∗
(0.738) (0.991) (0.672) (0.022) (0.025)
Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati(DC39) 0.201 -0.140 0.334 0.244 0.279
(0.581) (0.632) (0.417) (0.482) (0.522)
Eden(DC4) 0.944∗∗ 0.638 1.085∗ 0.594∗ 0.461
(0.004) (0.133) (0.049) (0.033) (0.101)
Ehlanzeni(DC32) 0.359 0.585∗∗ 0.716 0.389 0.679∗
(0.175) (0.006) (0.069) (0.168) (0.025)
Ekurhuleni(EKU) -0.0472 0.379 0.0809 0.196 0.627∗
(0.922) (0.201) (0.869) (0.534) (0.014)
Fezile Dabi(DC20) 0.952∗∗ 0.348 0.869 0.159 0.538
(0.002) (0.231) (0.121) (0.556) (0.063)
Frances Baard(DC9) 0.618∗ 0.907∗∗∗ 0.359 -0.0710 0.166
(0.049) (0.001) (0.451) (0.846) (0.622)
Gert Sibande(DC30) 0.643∗∗ 0.165 0.655 0.466 0.362
(0.004) (0.477) (0.103) (0.095) (0.176)
Greater Sekhukhune(DC47) 0.475 0.131 0.182 -0.215 0.471
(0.098) (0.644) (0.636) (0.472) (0.122)
Joe Gqabi(DC14) 0.790∗∗ 0.669∗∗ 0.859∗ 0.0224 0.428
(0.001) (0.003) (0.027) (0.949) (0.366)
John Taolo Gaetsewe(DC45) 0.407 0.133 0.491 -0.482 0.437
(0.051) (0.613) (0.280) (0.124) (0.270)
Lejweleputswa(DC18) 0.216 -0.314 0.203 -0.199 0.0558
(0.528) (0.420) (0.651) (0.584) (0.878)
Mangaung(MAN) 0.437 -0.609 1.064 0.157 0.322
(0.516) (0.244) (0.073) (0.745) (0.333)
Mopani(DC33) 0.119 0.219 0.733 0.538∗ 0.403
(0.665) (0.457) (0.080) (0.040) (0.265)
Namakwa(DC6) 0.602 0.446 0.526 0.0407 0.601∗
(0.122) (0.502) (0.303) (0.898) (0.042)
Nelson Mandela Bay(NMA) 0.597∗ 0.445 0.542 0.316 0.287
(0.028) (0.068) (0.194) (0.248) (0.312)
Ngaka Modiri Molema(DC38) -0.278 -0.356 0.487 -0.0345 -0.0757
(0.347) (0.156) (0.236) (0.906) (0.799)
Nkangala(DC31) 0.571∗ 0.306 0.600 0.248 0.796∗∗
(0.033) (0.421) (0.151) (0.361) (0.003)
O.R.Tambo(DC15) 0.221 0.0520 -0.139 -0.725 0.539∗
(0.331) (0.813) (0.773) (0.123) (0.041)
Overberg(DC3) 1.016∗∗ 0.701 0.812 0.521 0.586∗
(0.004) (0.070) (0.066) (0.072) (0.026)
Pixley ka Seme(DC7) 1.145∗ 0.910∗ 1.155∗ 0.573 0.873∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.012) (0.073) (0.001)
Sedibeng(DC42) -0.321 0.161 0.281 0.0294 0.0739
(0.302) (0.483) (0.525) (0.925) (0.816)
Sisonke(DC43) -0.0641 0.500∗ 0.682 0.197 0.298
(0.779) (0.016) (0.074) (0.490) (0.371)
Siyanda(DC8) 1.134∗ 0.332 0.634 0.493 0.620∗
(0.049) (0.446) (0.164) (0.177) (0.035)
Thabo Mofutsanyane(DC19) 0.0592 0.441 0.692 0.394 0.692
(0.891) (0.088) (0.147) (0.294) (0.095)
UMgungundlovu(DC22) 0.260 0.401∗ 0.498 -0.114 0.305
(0.328) (0.045) (0.218) (0.715) (0.289)
Ugu(DC21) 0.282 0.0631 0.380 -0.154 0.314
(0.253) (0.795) (0.344) (0.574) (0.245)
Umkhanyakude(DC27) 0.573 -0.0620 -0.224 0.574∗ -0.485
(0.068) (0.842) (0.636) (0.048) (0.057)
Umzinyathi(DC24) 0.567∗ 0.368 0.708 0.261 0.0505
(0.045) (0.129) (0.070) (0.330) (0.882)
Uthukela(DC23) 0.748∗∗∗ 0.302 0.613 -0.341 1.637∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.172) (0.114) (0.344) (0.000)
Uthungulu(DC28) 0.515 0.230 0.180 -0.239 0.545
(0.063) (0.357) (0.665) (0.433) (0.414)
Vhembe(DC34) 0.188 -0.359 0.431 -0.139 0.753∗
(0.463) (0.371) (0.457) (0.853) (0.025)
Waterberg(DC36) 0.239 0.566 0.478 0.0925 0.596∗
(0.502) (0.067) (0.278) (0.733) (0.018)
West Coast(DC1) 0.727 0.930 1.497∗∗ 0.640∗ 0.739∗∗
(0.249) (0.069) (0.002) (0.038) (0.006)
West Rand(DC48) -0.105 -0.485 0.883 -0.451 0.191
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(0.815) (0.189) (0.078) (0.136) (0.546)
Xhariep(DC16) 0.179 0.143 0.939∗ -0.124 0.440
(0.561) (0.557) (0.030) (0.758) (0.231)
Zululand(DC26) 0.738∗ 0.646∗ 0.894∗ 0.161 -0.493
(0.016) (0.013) (0.034) (0.615) (0.144)
eThekwini(ETH) 0.695∗∗ 0.412 0.739 0.152 0.463
(0.008) (0.257) (0.065) (0.658) (0.108)
iLembe(DC29) 0.250 0.172 0.710 0.175 0.552
(0.319) (0.444) (0.085) (0.603) (0.067)
Above Average Income 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Average Income 0.123 0.447∗ 0.131 -0.120 -0.0979
(0.596) (0.038) (0.384) (0.316) (0.255)
Below Average Income 0.0555 0.306 0.0571 -0.376∗∗ -0.342∗∗
(0.811) (0.156) (0.709) (0.003) (0.003)
Relative Income: Don’t Know -0.237 0.499 0.499∗ -0.238 -0.0169
(0.351) (0.063) (0.011) (0.179) (0.919)
Much Above Average Income 0.0660 -0.190 -0.0718 -0.860∗∗∗ -0.523∗
(0.854) (0.591) (0.817) (0.001) (0.012)
Much Below Average Income -0.497∗ -0.0379 -0.263 -0.417∗∗ -0.759∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.861) (0.120) (0.006) (0.000)
Drinks Alcohol: 1-2 Days A Week 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Drinks Alcohol: 3-4 Days A Week 0.0348 0.237 -1.120 -0.317 -0.121
(0.935) (0.703) (0.134) (0.429) (0.654)
Drinks Alcohol: 5-6 Days a Week -0.619 0.417 -0.596 -0.796 0.0186
(0.245) (0.190) (0.158) (0.124) (0.909)
Drinks Alcohol: < 1 Days a Week -0.0201 0.119 -0.264 -0.338 -0.236
(0.966) (0.757) (0.491) (0.338) (0.185)
Drinks Alcohol: Very Rarely 0.160 -0.215 -0.0101 -0.259 0.113
(0.526) (0.328) (0.966) (0.241) (0.356)
Drinks Alcohol: Everyday -0.221 -0.251 0.291 -0.927∗ 0.107
(0.838) (0.367) (0.363) (0.024) (0.667)
Drinks Alcohol: Never Has 0.0920 -0.159 -0.192 -0.242 0.106
(0.688) (0.407) (0.365) (0.216) (0.360)
Drinks Alcohol: No Longer Drinks -0.0448 -0.0387 -0.348 -0.173 -0.245
(0.857) (0.857) (0.133) (0.413) (0.092)
Smoking: Doesn’t Know 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Smoking: No 1.165∗∗∗ 0.505 -0.529 3.715∗∗∗ -0.442
(0.000) (0.244) (0.167) (0.000) (0.077)
Smoking: Yes 1.096∗∗∗ 0.352 -0.724 3.386∗∗∗ -0.592∗
(0.001) (0.421) (0.054) (0.000) (0.024)
Not Spouse of Head 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Spouse of Head 0.380∗∗ -0.134 -0.177 0.0315 -0.0924
(0.008) (0.333) (0.174) (0.797) (0.430)
Relative Income: Not Applicable -3.520∗∗∗ -0.444
(0.000) (0.220)
Smoking: Not Applicable -0.334
(0.464)
Mothers Ed: Cert w < Grade 12 0
(.)
Father’s Ed: Refused -0.0263
(0.924)
Constant -0.692 -1.348 -0.438 -5.417∗∗∗ -1.189
(0.274) (0.065) (0.667) (0.000) (0.076)
Observations 1068 1070 1066 1068 1067
R2 0.249 0.269 0.261 0.268 0.320
Root MSE 1.037 0.988 1.002 0.972 0.861
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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